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Absurdity and Excessively Delayed
Executions
Russell L. Christopher*
While capital punishment per se is constitutionally permissible, is
“capital punishment plus” unconstitutional? Death row prisoners claim
that capital punishment plus as much as thirty years or more of postsentence, pre-execution death row incarceration is disproportionate and
excessive, constituting cruel and unusual punishment. While Justice Breyer
and former Justice Stevens defend the claim as meritorious, Justice
Thomas derides it as a mockery of justice and nearly every court denies
the claim. In upholding the constitutionality of such excessively delayed
executions, courts principally rely on a trio of arguments. Utilizing a
reductio ad absurdum method of argument, this Article demonstrates that
the trio would absurdly deny numerous, long-standing, fundamental rights
emanating from the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments and
expressly guaranteed by the Supreme Court. By absurdly denying clearly
existing constitutional rights, the trio is unsound. Demonstrating that the
trio is unsound clears the path for courts to recognize that excessively
delayed executions violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment.
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INTRODUCTION
On America’s death row, delays between sentence and execution are
now approaching forty years.1 In what are known as “Lackey claims,”
after Clarence Lackey’s 1995 petition to the Supreme Court for a writ
of certiorari, death row prisoners argue that execution following
decades of death row incarceration is disproportionate punishment
violating the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment for two reasons.2 As Brent Newton, counsel for
Lackey and architect of the Lackey claim explained, “first . . .
execution after . . . [incarceration] under the extreme conditions of
death row for such a lengthy period of time would exact more
punishment than . . . the Eighth Amendment [allows]; and second, . . .
neither of the state’s primary interests . . . — retribution and
deterrence — would be meaningfully served . . . after such a lengthy
delay . . . .”3 Despite Justice Stephen Breyer and former Justice John
Paul Stevens championing Lackey claims,4 for nearly twenty years —
until 2014 — no court had recognized them.5
1 See Muhammad v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 894, 894 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari). The prisoner, aka Thomas Knight, received his death
sentence in 1975. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 994 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari). Therefore, he had been incarcerated on death row for thirtynine years. Far from being an isolated instance, over 200 prisoners have been on death
row for thirty to forty years. TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT, 2012 — STATISTICAL TABLES 18 tbl.15 (rev. 2014) (stating that 33 current
death row prisoners were placed there from 1974–1979, 60 from 1980–1982, and 121
from 1983–1985).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“[N]or cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
Although the Supreme Court denied Lackey’s petition, Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045,
1045 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari), the similar claims brought by
numerous other death row prisoners have become known as “Lackey claims.” E.g.,
Moore v. State, 771 N.E.2d 46, 54 (Ind. 2002) (“This claim [of substantially delayed
execution] has become known as a Lackey claim.”); Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of
Fear and Death: Successive Problems in Capital Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 699, 762 (2002) (“[T]he claim of inordinate delay of execution [is] commonly
known as a ‘Lackey claim.’”).
3 Brent E. Newton, The Slow Wheels of Furman’s Machinery of Death, 13 J. APP.
PRAC. & PROCESS 41, 54-55 (2012) [hereinafter Slow Wheels].
4 See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Capital Punishment: A Century of
Discontinuous Debate, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 681 (2010) (“Over the past
fifteen years, Justices Stevens and Breyer have repeatedly called for the Court to
address the issue, with Justice Breyer characterizing the claim as ‘serious’ (quoting
Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 944 (1998) (dissenting from denial of certiorari))
and ‘particularly strong,’ (quoting Knight, 528 U.S. at 993 (dissenting from denial of
certiorari)), and Justice Stevens ultimately declaring that prolonged death row
incarceration is ‘unacceptably cruel.’” (quoting Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114,
1116 (2009) (respecting denial of certiorari))). For Justice Breyer’s most recent
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Repeatedly denying Lackey claims, courts have principally relied on
three arguments. First, death row prisoners choose to pursue appellate
and collateral review of their sentence.6 As chosen by prisoners, a
consequence of that choice — delay between sentence and execution —
is attributable to the prisoners, not the State.7 “It makes ‘a mockery of
our system of justice . . . for a convicted murderer, who [chooses
appellate and collateral review that causes] . . . the almost-indefinite
postponement of his sentence, to then claim that the almost-indefinite
postponement renders his sentence unconstitutional.’”8 Second,
appellate and collateral review of capital sentences is necessary to
ensure their accuracy and fairness.9 A consequence of what is necessary
to ensure accuracy and fairness — delay between sentence and
execution — must be constitutionally permissible.10 “[D]eath row
delays [are constitutional] because delay results from the ‘desire of our
courts, state and federal, to get it right, to explore . . . any argument that
might save someone’s life.’”11 Third, appellate and collateral review of
capital sentences is necessary to satisfy the Eighth Amendment.12 “It
dissent from a denial of certiorari of a Lackey claim, see Muhammad, 134 S. Ct. at 894.
5 See, e.g., Booker v. McNeil, No. 1:08cv143/RS, 2010 WL 3942866, at *38 n.12
(N.D. Fla. Oct. 5, 2010) (“[N]o federal or state courts have accepted [Lackey claims]
. . . .” (citations omitted)). In July 2014, Jones v. Chappell became the first (postLackey) case to recognize a Lackey claim. See Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050,
1069 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (vacating defendant’s death sentence because lengthy delays
between sentencing and execution have “resulted in a system that serves no
penological purpose” and is “unconstitutional”); Brent E. Newton, Justice Kennedy, the
Purposes of Capital Punishment, and the Future of Lackey Claims, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 979,
987, 998 (2014) [hereinafter Justice Kennedy] (reporting that “no lower court has
granted relief on a Lackey claim” but then noting in a Post-Script the announcement
of Jones’ recognition of a Lackey claim).
6 See, e.g., Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1117 (2009) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in denial of certiorari) (emphasizing that the “petitioner chose to challenge
his death sentence”); McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1470 n.21 (9th Cir. 1995)
(“[T]o the extent petitioners choose to delay execution in the hope of obtaining relief,
that is a choice they make for themselves.”).
7 See, e.g., Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 933 (4th Cir. 1995) (Luttig, J.,
concurring) (“The delay of which [the prisoner] now complains is a direct
consequence of his own litigation strategy . . . .”).
8 Thompson, 556 U.S. at 1117 (quoting Turner, 58 F.3d at 933).
9 See, e.g., State v. Smith, 931 P.2d 1272, 1288 (Mont. 1996) (“[T]he cause for
the delay . . . [was that the prisoner] ‘availed himself of procedures our law provides
to ensure that executions are carried out only in appropriate circumstances.’” (quoting
McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1466-67)).
10 See Thompson v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 517 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir.
2008).
11 Id. (quoting Chambers v. Bowersox, 157 F.3d 560, 570 (8th Cir. 1998)).
12 See, e.g., White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting the state’s
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would be a mockery of justice to conclude that delays caused by
satisfying the Eighth Amendment themselves violate it.”13
These three arguments have been extraordinarily influential in
denying Lackey claims. Nearly every court addressing Lackey claims
on the merits has invoked at least one, if not all three.14 Most of the
federal circuit courts have invoked all three and Supreme Court
Justice Clarence Thomas endorses at least two of them.15 These
arguments have apparently been sufficiently persuasive to the full
Court; it steadfastly has declined to accept review of Lackey claims.16
Until 2014, no court had disagreed with them.17
This Article demonstrates, however, that these three influential
arguments entail absurd consequences — the denial of fundamental,
long-standing constitutional rights. That is, not only do they deny a
claimed Eighth Amendment right against excessively delayed
execution, but they also deny constitutional rights expressly
guaranteed by the Supreme Court. Demonstrating that this trio of
arguments leads to absurd or false conclusions denying clearly existing
constitutional rights demonstrates that the trio is unsound.18
Eliminating the support of the trio eliminates the primary obstacle to

“interest in insuring that those who are executed receive fair trials with
constitutionally mandated safeguards”).
13 State v. Moore, 591 N.W.2d 86, 94 (Neb. 1999); accord McKenzie, 57 F.3d at
1467 (“We cannot conclude that delays caused by satisfying the Eighth Amendment
themselves violate it.”).
14 See, e.g., Jane Marriott, Walking the Eighth Amendment Tightrope: ‘Time Served’ in
the United States Supreme Court, in AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY: INTERNATIONAL
INITIATIVES AND IMPLICATIONS 159, 179 (Jon Yorke ed., 2008) (“[There are] three forms
of reasoning that inevitably le[a]d to the [Lackey] claim being rejected. First . . . that
courts may find compelling reasons for the delay. Second, . . . delays caused by way of
satisfying the demands of the Eighth Amendment simply cannot violate it. Third, . . .
the delay was not attributable to the state . . . .”); see also infra notes 123, 151, 166.
15 See infra Part I.C.1.b and note 232.
16 See, e.g., Thompson, 517 F.3d at 1284 (noting “the total absence of Supreme
Court precedent”). For the most recent denial of certiorari of a Lackey claim triggering
a response by a Justice, see Muhammad v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 894, 894 (2014) (Breyer,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
17 See Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1066 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (rejecting two
of these arguments as “simply incorrect” on empirical grounds); see also infra Part I.C.
18 An argument is unsound if either its form of reasoning is invalid or if it contains
a false premise. See Albert E. Blumberg, Modern Logic, in 5 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY 12, 13 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967) (explaining the “term ‘sound,’ to refer to
arguments that both are valid and contain true premises”); Christopher Kirwan,
Argument, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO PHILOSOPHY 49, 49 (Ted Honderich ed., 2d ed.
2005) (noting that ‘sound’ refers to “valid arguments with true premises”).
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courts recognizing that execution following decades of death row
incarceration is unconstitutional.
Utilizing a reductio ad absurdum method of argument,19 this Article
assumes the soundness of the trio in order to apply the trio to a variety
of constitutional rights and assess the consequences. If that application
leads to absurd or false conclusions, then the trio is unsound. As an
example, to see how the trio leads to absurd or false conclusions,
suppose an indigent defendant exercises her Sixth Amendment right
to the appointment of counsel.20 Following conviction, she appeals
claiming that her appointed counsel was ineffective and her Sixth
Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel was violated.21
Further suppose that an appellate court denies her claim based on the
following application of the trio to this Sixth Amendment context.
First, the defendant chose to have appointed counsel.22 As chosen by
the defendant, a consequence of that choice — ineffectiveness of
counsel — is attributable to the defendant, not the State.23 It makes a
mockery of our system of justice for a defendant to request the
appointment of counsel at State expense and, after that counsel is
furnished, then to complain that her counsel’s ineffectiveness renders
her conviction unconstitutional.24 Second, the appointment of counsel
for indigents is necessary for accuracy and fairness.25 A consequence of
what is necessary for accuracy and fairness — ineffectiveness of
counsel — must be constitutionally permissible.26 The appointment of
19 “The reductio ad absurdum is a valid argument form which is widely used and
highly effective.” WESLEY C. SALMON, LOGIC 30 (1963). Under this method, to
demonstrate that an argument is unsound, its truth is assumed. If that assumption
leads to false or absurd consequences, then the assumption may be false and the
argument may be rejected. See, e.g., JULIAN BAGGINI & PETER S. FOSL, THE PHILOSOPHER’S
TOOLKIT: A COMPENDIUM OF PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS AND METHODS 117 (2003)
(“[T]he philosopher starts with premises held by those whose position they
undermine . . . follow[ing] through the logic of the premises to their absurd
conclusion . . . hop[ing] to show that, if the premises lead to absurd consequences, the
premises must be wrong.”); see also infra note 182.
20 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963) (extending the Sixth Amendment right to
appointed counsel for indigents to state court defendants via the Fourteenth
Amendment as a matter of fundamental fairness essential to a fair trial).
21 See infra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
22 Compare statement in text, with supra note 6 and accompanying text.
23 Compare statement in text, with supra note 7 and accompanying text.
24 Compare statement in text, with supra note 8 and accompanying text.
25 Compare statement in text, with supra note 9 and accompanying text.
26 Compare statement in text, with supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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counsel cannot result in a Sixth Amendment violation because
appointment of counsel stems from the desire of our courts, state and
federal, to get it right, to furnish any assistance that might prevent a
wrongful conviction.27 Third, the appointment of counsel for indigents
(charged with a felony) is necessary to satisfy the Sixth Amendment.28
It would be a mockery of justice for ineffectiveness of counsel caused
by satisfying the Sixth Amendment to violate it.29 Not only does the
trio deny an indigent with appointed counsel a constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel, but also granting such a right would be
a mockery of justice.
Of course, something is terribly wrong. The trio did not deny the
defendant’s ineffectiveness claim because the defendant did, in fact,
receive effective counsel. Nor did the trio deny the claim because the
defendant failed to meet her evidentiary burden or failed to establish
prejudice. Rather, the trio denied her claim by establishing that the
defendant lacks a Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel in principle. Moreover, the trio would establish that no
defendant enjoys both the right to appointed counsel and the right to
effective assistance of counsel. Something is terribly wrong because, of
course, all defendants exercising the right to counsel, “whether
retained or appointed,” do have a Sixth Amendment right to the
effective assistance of counsel.30 Beginning with Powell v. Alabama31 in
1932, the Supreme Court has long recognized and repeatedly held that
the Sixth Amendment “‘right to counsel is the right to the effective
assistance of counsel.’”32 Because the trio absurdly denies a clearly
existing, long-standing constitutional right expressly guaranteed by
the Supreme Court, the trio is unsound.
Perhaps, one might object, the delayed execution and right to
counsel contexts are disanalogous. While ineffectiveness of counsel is
only a possible consequence of a defendant exercising the right to
counsel, delay between sentencing and execution is a necessary
consequence of a death row prisoner seeking post-conviction review.
As will be discussed more expansively below,33 the objection is
27

Compare statement in text, with supra note 11 and accompanying text.
Compare statement in text, with supra note 12 and accompanying text.
29 Compare statement in text, with supra note 13 and accompanying text.
30 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).
31 287 U.S. 45, 58 (1932) (“[Because counsel was ineffective,] we hold that
defendants were not accorded the right of counsel in any substantial sense.”).
32 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771
n.14 (1970)).
33 See infra Part II.G.3.
28
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unpersuasive. While some delay may be a necessary consequence of
post-conviction review, the entirety of, for example, a thirty-year delay
stemming from multiple “constitutionally defective sentencing
proceedings” is unnecessary and avoidable.34 Furthermore, because
the nationwide average period of delay is less than sixteen years, the
average delays of twenty-five years in California and Florida are clearly
unnecessary and avoidable.35 As a result, just as ineffectiveness of
counsel is only a possible consequence of a defendant’s choice to
exercise the right to counsel, so also particularly lengthy or excessive
delay is only a possible consequence of a prisoner’s choice to pursue
post-conviction review. On that basis, the two contexts are analogous.
One might still object that there is something special about the Sixth
Amendment context in which the trio leads to an absurd or false
conclusion. But this Article will demonstrate that the trio absurdly
denies six other clearly existing constitutional rights stemming from
the Fifth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment, and the Due Process and
Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. That the trio
absurdly denies seven clearly existing, long-standing, fundamental
constitutional rights established by the Supreme Court and stemming
from three different constitutional Amendments suggests that the
problem with the trio lies not in their application to that one context
and one right but in the trio itself.
We now have more than a hint as to why the trio has been so
influential in denying Lackey claims. Because the trio would deny
numerous, clearly existing constitutional rights guaranteed by the
Supreme Court, the trio establishes too high a bar for an actual or
claimed constitutional right to meet. If even long-standing,
fundamental constitutional rights guaranteed by the Supreme Court
cannot meet this too-high standard, a Lackey claim’s failure to meet
this too-high standard is no longer evidence that it fails to warrant
constitutional protection.
One might still object that the trio cannot fairly be applied to
constitutional rights outside the Eighth Amendment. As will be
discussed more fully below,36 the objection is unpersuasive for several
reasons. First, not only is there little about the three arguments
relevant only to the Eighth Amendment, there is little about them
relevant to the Eighth Amendment at all. Second, the three arguments
34 Smith v. Arizona, 552 U.S. 985, 985-86 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
35 See infra notes 66–68.
36 See infra Part II.G for a more comprehensive response to this possible objection,
as well as responses to other anticipated objections.
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themselves are framed as broad propositions meant to capture our
sense of intuition and reason about constitutional rights. They can
fairly be applied just as broadly as they are framed. Third, as will be
demonstrated, the arguments themselves derive from Sixth
Amendment speedy trial right analysis. Because the three arguments
themselves derive from arguments outside the Eighth Amendment
context, they may fairly be applied outside the Eighth Amendment
context.
In undertaking the first comprehensive critical examination of the
three principal arguments courts use to deny Lackey claims, this
Article does not make an affirmative case for why Lackey claims
should prevail. The affirmative case has already been extensively
advanced.37 But what is largely missing in the debate is each side
specifically addressing each other’s arguments.38 Moreover, each side
is talking past each other. Lackey claimants are making substantive
Eighth Amendment arguments about punishment;39 courts are largely
dismissing it as a procedural due process claim involving nothing more
than delay.40 Attempting to bridge this conceptual divide and redress
this imbalance in the debate, this Article directly engages with the
principal arguments of courts rejecting Lackey claims. In order to find
common ground, it assumes arguendo that the arguments are sound in
order to assess their consequences. The consequences of these
arguments, however, are the absurd denial of seven clearly existing,
long-standing constitutional rights guaranteed by the Supreme Court.
Because the trio leads to absurd or false conclusions — the nonexistence of clearly existing constitutional rights — the trio itself is
unsound.
The Article unfolds in the following Parts. After Part I furnishes an
overview of capital punishment and excessively delayed executions,
Part II demonstrates that the trio is unsound because the trio absurdly
denies the following clearly existing constitutional rights established
37 For the most recent examples, see Russell L. Christopher, Death Delayed Is
Retribution Denied, 99 MINN. L. REV. 421, 452-79 (2014) (arguing that execution
following prolonged death row incarceration violates retributivism); Michael Johnson,
Fifteen Years and Death: Double Jeopardy, Multiple Punishments, and Extended Stays on
Death Row, 23 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 85, 103-12 (2014) (contending that extended death
row incarceration violates double jeopardy). For a collection of the literature, see
Newton, Justice Kennedy, supra note 5, at 988 n.34. For the arguments of Justices
Breyer and Stevens, see cases cited infra notes 96–101 and accompanying text.
38 For criticisms that courts denying Lackey claims have not squarely addressed
the claims, see infra notes 238–39 and accompanying text.
39 See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text.
40 See infra notes 238–43 and accompanying text.
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by the Supreme Court: (i) Sixth Amendment right to a jury pool
representative of the community, (ii) Sixth Amendment and
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause rights to an impartial
jury, (iii) Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause right
against discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in jury selection,
(iv) Fifth Amendment right to a no-adverse-inference jury instruction
regarding the defendant’s choice not to testify, (v) Fifth Amendment
right against negative comments to the jury regarding the defendant’s
choice not to testify, and (vi) the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy
trial. Finally, Part II presents and counters four possible objections to
this Part’s claim that the trio is unsound.
While Part II demonstrates that the three arguments are unsound,
Part III explains why these three intuitively appealing arguments are
unsound. These explanations provide additional bases, independent
from Part II, for rejecting the trio. The flaw in the first argument — a
defendant/prisoner is responsible for the consequences of the
constitutional rights she chooses to exercise — is the false assumption
that the defendant/prisoner is ultimately responsible for the type of
trial the State conducts and the type of punishment the State imposes.
The flaw in the second and third arguments — the consequences of
what is necessary for accuracy, fairness, and satisfying the
Constitution cannot violate it — is the false assumption that what is
necessary to satisfy the Constitution is also sufficient. The mere
satisfaction of one right necessary to satisfy the Constitution will not
be sufficient to satisfy all of a defendant’s/prisoner’s multiple
constitutional rights. And in some cases, the consequences of
satisfying one right — necessary to satisfy the Constitution — will
violate another right thereby precluding the satisfaction of all of the
rights sufficient to satisfy the Constitution. By demonstrating that the
three principal arguments used by courts to deny Lackey claims are
unsound, this Article clears the path for courts to recognize that
execution following as much as thirty years or more of death row
incarceration violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment.
I.

OVERVIEW OF EXCESSIVELY DELAYED EXECUTIONS

After sketching a brief explanation of the constitutionality of capital
punishment in general, Part I charts the ever-increasing delays
between sentencing and execution, as well as their causes. Next, it
canvasses the early, pre-Lackey cases addressing excessively delayed
executions before examining Lackey itself and the ensuing debate on
the Court between Justices Breyer, Stevens, and Thomas. After
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surveying the chilly reception Lackey claims have received in the
lower courts over the last twenty years, this Part highlights two very
recent developments possibly portending a brighter future for the
claim. Finally, Part I more expansively presents, and notes the
criticisms of, the trio.
A. Constitutionality of Capital Punishment
In order to better understand the Lackey claim, a brief account of
the Supreme Court’s analysis of the constitutionality of capital
punishment may be helpful. In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia, the Court
found the death penalty unconstitutional as applied principally
because its imposition was arbitrary and capricious.41 “These death
sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by
lightning is cruel and unusual.”42 In 1976, in Gregg v. Georgia, the
Court upheld capital punishment as per se constitutional under a twopart test.43 First, capital punishment must be acceptable not only from
the perspective of the Eighth Amendment’s adoption in 1791, but also
to contemporary society — acceptable under “‘the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’”44 Second,
capital punishment “must accord with ‘the dignity of man,’ which is
the ‘basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment.’”45 This
principle of human dignity bars both “barbarous” methods of
execution46 that are “cruelly inhumane”47 and excessive
punishments.48 There are two types of excessive punishments —
unnecessary and disproportionate.49 An unnecessary punishment fails
to further legitimate penological goals — principally, retribution and
deterrence.50 A disproportionate punishment fails to sufficiently

41 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring)
(“[T]here is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [capital
punishment] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.”).
42 Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
43 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169-87 (1976).
44 Id. at 173 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
45 Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)).
46 Id. at 170-71.
47 Id. at 175.
48 See id. at 173-75 (explaining that punishment comporting with human dignity
“means, at least, that the punishment not be ‘excessive’”).
49 Id. at 173.
50 Id. at 183 (noting that unnecessary punishment constitutes “the gratuitous
infliction of suffering”).
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correlate with the severity of the offense51 or the culpability of the
offender.52 Regarding the severity of the offense, capital punishment is
proportionate to at least some types of murder,53 but is
disproportionate to the offense of rape.54 With respect to the
culpability of the offender, capital punishment is proportionate for at
least some adults, but is disproportionate for juveniles.55 The original
and primary conception of the Lackey claim maintains that execution
following lengthy death row incarceration violates the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment as
both unnecessary and disproportionate punishment.56 Another
conception of the claim argues that the lengthy death row
incarceration alone is unconstitutional as cruelly inhumane.57
B. Delay Between Sentence and Execution
Over time, the temporal intervals between capital sentencing and
execution and the duration of tenures on death row have steadily
risen. In the eighteenth-century William Blackstone reported that “in
England, it is enacted by statute that the judge, before whom a
murderer is convicted, shall in passing sentence, direct him to be
executed on the next day but one.”58 Terming the two days a “short
but awful interval,”59 Blackstone explained that the interval must be
51 Id. at 173 (assessing proportionality between the punishment and “the severity
of the crime”).
52 See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) (holding that capital
punishment is disproportionate for the mentally retarded because of their lesser
culpability).
53 See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (holding that death penalty is not
disproportionate to defendant’s murder conviction).
54 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (holding that capital
punishment is disproportionate to the crime of rape).
55 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (holding that capital
punishment is disproportionate for juveniles).
56 See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text; see also Ceja v. Stewart, 134 F.3d
1368, 1376 (9th Cir. 1998) (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (noting two different types of
Lackey claims).
57 See, e.g., Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1115 (2009) (Stevens, J.,
respecting denial of certiorari) (“[A]wait[ing] execution, petitioner has endured
especially severe conditions of confinement, spending up to 23 hours per day in
isolation in a 6- by 9-foot cell. Two death warrants [were] . . . stayed only shortly
before [his] . . . scheduled . . . [execution]. The dehumanizing effects of such
treatment are undeniable.”).
58 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *202 (internal citation omitted). That is,
execution must occur two days after the sentence.
59 Id.
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brief because “it is of great importance, that the punishment should
follow the crime as early as possible” in order to further the
penological goals of punishment.60 In colonial-era America, the typical
interval between sentencing and execution ranged from one to several
weeks.61 More recently, the nationwide average period of delay
jumped from two years in 1968,62 to six years in 1988,63 to ten years in
1998,64 to eleven years in 2008,65 and to nearly sixteen years in 2012.66
Currently, in California and Florida, the two leading death penalty
states (by number of persons on death row),67 the average delay is
twenty-five years.68 Nationwide, over 200 persons have been on death
row from thirty to forty years.69 These increasing “delays have
multiple causes.”70 Some blame the complex and lengthy appellate and
collateral review process71 and the intentional delay of prisoners.72
60 Id. at *397 (“[T]he prospect of gratification . . . [from] commit[ting] the crime,
should instantly awake the attendant idea of punishment. Delay of execution serves
only to separate these ideas; and then the execution itself affects the minds of the
spectators rather as a terrible sight, than as the necessary consequence of
transgression.”).
61 E.g., STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 17 (2002).
62 See People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 894 n.37 (Cal. 1972) (en banc) (noting
that the national median period of death row incarceration in 1968 was 33.3 months),
superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 27, as recognized in
Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 90 (Cal. 2009).
63 SNELL, supra note 1, at 14 tbl.10.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 18 tbl.15 (California: 712, Florida: 403).
68 In California, delays between sentencing and execution “exceed[] 25 years on
average.” Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1066 (C.D. Cal. 2014). According to
Justice Anthony Kennedy, “[t]he last ten people Florida has executed have spent an
average of 24.9 years on death row.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 46, Hall v. Florida,
134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014) (No. 12-10882), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-10882_6kh7.pdf.
69 SNELL, supra note 1, at 18 tbl.15 (citing 121 current death row prisoners placed
there from 1983–1985, 60 from 1980–1982, and 33 from 1974–1979).
70 Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1116 (2009) (Stevens, J., respecting denial
of certiorari).
71 See, e.g., Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 957-58 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“[T]his Court and the lower federal courts have
converted the constitutional limits upon imposition of the death penalty . . . into
arcane niceties which parallel the equity court practices described in Charles Dickens’
‘Bleak House.’”).
72 See, e.g., Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 933 (4th Cir. 1995) (Luttig, J.,
concurring) (referring to prisoners’ “interminable efforts of delay and systemic
abuse”).
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Others blame states’ constitutionally defective procedures73 and a
dysfunctional system overburdened due to insufficient resources.74
Regardless of their cause, these increasing delays have transformed a
death sentence from capital punishment per se into capital
punishment plus or “decades-plus-death.”75 What was once an
execution preceded by a de minimis period of administrative detention
has now become “two separate punishments: lengthy incarceration
under very severe conditions (essentially solitary confinement in many
states), followed by an execution.”76 For some capital offenders, the
death penalty has become the equivalent of incarceral punishment in
the form of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole plus
capital punishment.
In the pre-Lackey era, involving comparatively shorter delays, courts
were comparatively more receptive to prisoners’ claims. Perhaps the
first (and only) Supreme Court decision addressing the
constitutionality of execution delay is In re Medley77 in 1890.
Regarding a delay of only four weeks, the Court stated, in dicta, that
“one of the most horrible feelings to which [the death row prisoner]
can be subjected during that time is the uncertainty . . . . [The]
immense mental anxiety amount[ed] to a great increase of the
offender’s punishment.”78 No court squarely addressed the issue again
until 1960 in Chessman v. Dickson.79 Noting that any threshold for
when excessive delay might become unconstitutional would be
“arbitrary,” the Ninth Circuit affirmed the constitutionality of a
twelve-year delay.80 In subsequently superseded decisions, both the
73 See, e.g., Smith v. Arizona, 552 U.S. 985, 985 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (“[M]uch of the delay at issue seems due to constitutionally
defective sentencing proceedings.”); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 998 (1999)
(Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (characterizing delays as stemming
primarily from states’ “constitutionally defective death penalty procedures”).
74 See, e.g., Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (“[T]he
dysfunctional administration of California’s death penalty system has resulted, and
will continue to result, in an inordinate and unpredictable period of delay
preceding . . . execution[s].”); id. at 1056-57 (noting “the State’s underfunding of its
death penalty system to be a key source of the problem”).
75 Elizabeth Rapaport, A Modest Proposal: The Aged of Death Row Should Be Deemed
Too Old to Execute, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1089, 1124 (2012).
76 Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Entrenchment and/or Destabilization?
Reflections on (Another) Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment,
30 LAW & INEQ. 211, 230-31 (2012).
77 134 U.S. 160 (1890).
78 Id. at 172.
79 275 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1960).
80 Id. at 607.
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California Supreme Court in 1972 and the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts in 1980 ruled capital punishment as unconstitutionally
cruel based, in part, on lengthy delays between sentencing and
execution.81 Arguing that delays frustrate the penological goals of
punishment, in 1981 Justice Rehnquist urged that executions be
expedited to preserve “the integrity of the entire criminal justice
system.”82 In 1986, a federal district court found a twelve-year delay,
for which the prisoner was deemed responsible, constitutional.83 In
two cases that perhaps influenced Justices Breyer and Stevens, the
European Court of Human Rights in 1989 and the British Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in 1993 ruled that executions
following lengthy terms of death row incarceration violate
prohibitions against “inhuman and degrading” punishment or
treatment.84 The latter court established the threshold of five years of
death row confinement as being presumptively unconstitutional.85
The modern era of the debate over excessively delayed executions
began with Lackey v. Texas in 1995.86 Clarence Lackey’s petition for
certiorari to the Supreme Court claimed that execution following
seventeen years of death row incarceration violated the Eighth

81 People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 894 (Cal. 1972) (en banc) (“The cruelty of
capital punishment [also] lies . . . in the dehumanizing effects of the lengthy
imprisonment prior to execution . . . .”), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL.
CONST. art. 1, § 27, as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 90 (Cal. 2009);
Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1283 (Mass. 1980)
(“[M]ental pain is an inseparable part of our practice of punishing criminals by death,
for the prospect of pending execution exacts a frightful toll during the inevitable long
wait between the imposition of sentence and the actual infliction of death.” (quoting
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 287-88 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring))),
superseded by constitutional amendment, MASS. CONST. art. CXVI, as recognized in
Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116, 117-18 (Mass. 1984).
82 Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 959 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
83 Richmond v. Ricketts, 640 F. Supp. 767, 803 (D. Ariz. 1986) (“The delay in the
execution was prompted by [the prisoner].”).
84 Pratt v. Att’y Gen. of Jamaica, [1994] 2 A.C. 1 (P.C.) 35 (appeal taken from
Jam.) (holding that execution after fourteen years on death row was unconstitutional
“inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment”); Soering v. United Kingdom,
11 Eur. Ct. H.R.439, 472, 475-78 (1989) (ruling that an extraditee’s potential six to
eight year term of death row incarceration if extradited to Virginia would constitute
“torture or . . . inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”). For their possible
influence on Justices Breyer and Stevens, see Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1047
(1995) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari).
85 Pratt, 2 A.C. at 35 (finding a five-year delay as “strong grounds” for a violation).
86 514 U.S. at 1045.
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Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.87
Though the full Court denied review, Justice Stevens commented that
Lackey’s claim was “not without foundation.”88 Neither of the grounds
justifying the constitutionality of capital punishment “arguabl[y] . . .
retains any force for prisoners who have spent some 17 years under a
sentence of death.”89 First, “[s]uch a delay, if it ever occurred,
certainly would have been rare in 1789, and thus the practice of the
Framers would not justify a denial of petitioner’s claim.”90 Second,
execution furthers neither of the penological goals of capital
punishment — retribution and deterrence — after such lengthy
delay.91 Justice Stevens also noted that English jurists and foreign
courts had found similar claims “persuasive.”92 Justice Breyer simply
noted his agreement “that the issue is an important undecided one.”93
Though Justice Stevens found Lackey’s claim sufficient to warrant
review by the full Court,94 he invited the lower courts “to ‘serve as
laboratories in which the issue receives further study before it is
addressed by this Court.’”95 Encouraged by Justices Breyer and
Stevens, numerous death row prisoners subsequently filed Lackey
claims that the lower courts repeatedly rejected and the full Court
declined to review. Respecting the denial of these certiorari petitions, a
lively debate arose between Justices Breyer, Stevens, and Thomas.
Justice Breyer wrote dissenting memorandums to the denial of
certiorari or denial of stay of execution in eight cases96 and agreed
with or joined Justice Stevens in two further cases.97 Justice Stevens
87

Id. at 1045.
Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 See id. (“[A]fter such an extended time, the acceptable state interest in
retribution has arguably been satisfied by the severe punishment already inflicted.”);
id. at 1046 (“[T]he additional deterrent effect from an actual execution now, on the
one hand, as compared to 17 years on death row followed by the prisoner’s continued
incarceration for life, on the other, seems minimal.”).
92 Id. at 1047.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 1045.
95 Id. at 1047 (quoting McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 963 (1983) (Stevens,
J., respecting denial of certiorari)).
96 See Muhammad v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 894, 894 (2014); Valle v. Florida, 132 S.
Ct. 1, 1 (2011); Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1119 (2009); Smith v. Arizona,
552 U.S. 985, 985 (2007); Allen v. Ornoski, 546 U.S. 1136, 1140 (2006); Foster v.
Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 991 (2002); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 993 (1999);
Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 944 (1998).
97 Johnson v. Bredesen, 558 U.S. 1067, 1067 (2009); Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1047.
88
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found merit in the prisoners’ claims in three cases98 and emphasized
that denial of certiorari “does not constitute a ruling on the merits” in
two other cases.99 Justices Breyer and Stevens agreed that excessively
delayed executions violate the Eighth Amendment because the “the
penological justifications for the death penalty diminish as the delay
lengthens.”100 The remedy is barring execution after such delays.101
Concurring in the denial of certiorari in four cases, Justice Thomas102
found delays constitutional because they stemmed from efforts, both
by courts to ensure that prisoners receive due process,103 and by
prisoners to exploit these procedural requirements to manufacture
delay.104 As “mak[ing] ‘a mockery of our system of justice,’”105 Justice
Thomas noted that Lackey claims require no other remedy than
reminding prisoners that they are free to craft their own remedy by
simply “submitting to . . . execution.”106 Assessing the lower courts’
response to Justice Stevens’ invitation that they serve as laboratories
for further study of Lackey claims, Justice Thomas concluded: “These
courts have resoundingly rejected the claim as meritless. I submit that
the Court should consider the experiment concluded.”107 Justice
Breyer disagreed, replying that most courts have avoided the merits of
Lackey claims and denied them instead on procedural grounds.108
Until recently, Justice Thomas’ view had prevailed. From 1995
through 2013, no American court had recognized a Lackey claim.
Moreover, the last American court to find execution following lengthy
delay to be unconstitutional was in 1980.109 While the next section
will present the three principal arguments, Justice Thomas and courts
98

See Johnson, 558 U.S. at 1067; Thompson, 556 U.S. at 1114; Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045.
Foster, 537 U.S. at 990; Knight, 528 U.S. at 990.
100 Johnson, 558 U.S. at 1069.
101 E.g., id. (“[A] successful Lackey claim would have the effect of rendering invalid
a particular death sentence . . . .”).
102 Id. at 1070; Thompson, 556 U.S. at 1116; Foster, 537 U.S. at 990; Knight, 528
U.S. at 990.
103 See, e.g., Knight, 528 U.S. at 991 (“[T]he delay in carrying out the prisoner’s
execution stems from this Court’s Byzantine death penalty jurisprudence.”).
104 See, e.g., Thompson, 556 U.S. at 1117 (referring to a prisoner’s “litigation
strategy, which delays his execution”).
105 Id. (quoting Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 933 (4th Cir. 1995)).
106 Foster, 537 U.S. at 991 (“Petitioner could long ago have ended [the delay] . . .
by submitting to what the people of Florida have deemed him to deserve:
execution.”).
107 Knight, 528 U.S. at 992-93 (citations omitted).
108 See id. at 998-99 (dissenting from denial of certiorari).
109 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
99
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denying Lackey claims have employed several other arguments as well.
First, while international precedent supports Lackey claims, such
precedent is neither binding nor persuasive.110 Second, there simply is
no American precedent.111 Third, recognizing a Lackey claim would
only exacerbate the delay.112 Fourth, alternatively, recognizing Lackey
claims would promote “speed rather than accuracy.”113 And fifth, “the
delay in carrying out death sentences has been of benefit to death row
inmates, allowing [them] to extend their lives.”114
But two recent developments indicate that Justice Thomas’
suggested closing of the Lackey claim experiment may have been
premature. First, Justice Anthony Kennedy, often the crucial “‘swing
vote’” in high-profile cases that split an ideologically divided court,115
may have signaled his endorsement of the Lackey claim.116 In oral
argument of Hall v. Florida, in March 2014, Justice Kennedy
repeatedly asked Florida’s counsel whether average delays of twentyfive years were “‘consistent with the purposes of the death penalty.’”117

110 See, e.g., Foster, 537 U.S. at 990 & n.* (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari) (“[T]his Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence should not impose
foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.”); Booker v. McNeil, No.
1:08cv143/RS, 2010 WL 3942866, at *40-41 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 5, 2010) (denying
prisoner’s claim that “binding norms of international law” prohibit his execution after
twenty-nine years on death row).
111 See, e.g., Thompson v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 517 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th
Cir. 2008) (denying prisoner’s Lackey claim “given the total absence of Supreme Court
precedent”); Gardner v. State, 234 P.3d 1115, 1142 n.231 (Utah 2010) (“The
courts . . . have uniformly rejected Lackey claims.”).
112 See, e.g., Knight, 528 U.S. at 992 (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)
(contending that recognizing a Lackey claim would “prolong collateral review by
giving virtually every capital prisoner yet another ground on which to challenge and
delay his execution”); Gardner, 234 P.3d at 1143 (invoking the prospect of “endless
delay”).
113 McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1467 (9th Cir. 1995); accord Knight, 528 U.S.
at 992 (“[Reviewing courts might give] short shrift to a capital defendant’s legitimate
claims so as to avoid violating the Eighth Amendment right suggested by Justice
Breyer.”).
114 McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1467; accord Alex Kozinski, Tinkering with Death, in
DEBATING THE DEATH PENALTY 1, 7 (Hugo Adam Bedau & Paul G. Cassell eds., 2004)
(characterizing prisoners’ efforts to challenge their sentence as “diminishing the
severity of their sentence by endlessly postponing the day of reckoning”).
115 Newton, Justice Kennedy, supra note 5, at 979-80.
116 See id. at 980.
117 See id. at 991 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 46, Hall v. Florida, 134
S. Ct. 1986 (2014) (No. 12-10882), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-10882_6kh7.pdf). Newton suggested that
Justice Kennedy’s questioning is significant for two reasons:
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Justice Kennedy “may be on the brink of joining Justice Breyer and
former Justice Stevens” in supporting Lackey claims and urging the
full Court to address the issue.118
Second, in July 2014, Jones v. Chappell119 became the first federal
court decision recognizing a Lackey claim. The district court in Jones
held that execution following nineteen years on death row violated the
Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
for two reasons.120 First, because of systemic inordinate delay, so few
death row prisoners will actually be executed (as opposed to dying of
old age or other causes while on death row) as to make execution
unconstitutionally arbitrary.121 Second, delays are sufficiently lengthy
“that the death penalty is deprived of any deterrent or retributive effect
it might once have had.”122
C. The Trio of Principal Arguments Against Lackey Claims
This section presents each of the three principal arguments against
Lackey claims more expansively. It identifies the origin of each
argument, traces their subsequent use, reveals the breadth of their
adoption by Justice Thomas and the lower courts, and briefly notes
their criticisms.
1.

Prisoner Choice and Fault

The principal argument used to deny Lackey claims is that prisoners
choose to pursue appellate and collateral review of their sentence.123
First, they did not appear to be off the cuff. In the oral argument of a case in
which certiorari had been granted on a legal issue that had nothing to do
with Lackey, Justice Kennedy clearly had prepared for his Lackey-related
questions because he cited an arcane statistic about the average delay before
executions in the past ten Florida cases. Second, his repeated question about
“the purposes that the death penalty is designed to serve” certainly appears
to allude to the primary arguments made by Justices Stevens and Breyer in
addressing Lackey claims since 1995.
Id. at 992.
118 Id. at 980.
119 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050 (C.D. Cal. 2014).
120 Id. at 1053.
121 Id. at 1062-63.
122 Id. at 1063.
123 See, e.g., Rapaport, supra note 75, at 1090 (“For many jurists, attribution of
fault [between the prisoner and the State for the delay] is critical to resolving [the
Lackey claim].”); id. at 1099 (referring to the attribution of fault for the delay as “the
heart of the matter”); see also supra note 14.
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The consequence of that choice — delay — is therefore attributable to
the prisoners, not the State. First, this section examines the first case
to advance the argument and considers all subsequent pre-Lackey
cases. Second, it presents Justice Thomas’ articulations of the
argument. Third, it surveys post-Lackey state and lower federal courts’
formulations of the argument. This section concludes with an analysis
of the gradations of disagreement with the argument.
a.

Pre-Lackey Precedent

Chessman v. Dickson in 1960 is perhaps the first case to utter a
version of the prisoner fault argument: “I do not see how we can offer
life (under a death sentence) as a prize for one who can stall the
processes for a given number of years.”124 Citing Chessman, the court
in Richmond v. Ricketts, in 1986, explained that a twelve-year delay
failed to violate the Eighth Amendment because it “was prompted by
Richmond’s request . . . to have his challenges . . . heard by several
courts.”125 Affirming Richmond in 1992, the Ninth Circuit supported
its use of the prisoner fault argument by offering Chessman and
Andrews v. Shulsen as “relevant, though not controlling,
precedents.”126 The court explained that the Andrews “court reasoned
that to accept the petitioner’s argument would be ‘a mockery of justice’
given that the delay was attributable more to the petitioner’s actions
[of challenging his death sentence] than to the state’s.”127 Decided
shortly before Lackey, in 1995, the Seventh Circuit in Free v. Peters
denied a Lackey claim because “any inordinate delay in the execution
of Free’s sentence is directly attributable to his own conduct.”128
b.

Justice Thomas’ Articulations of the Argument

Justice Thomas emphasized prisoners’ choice of and fault for
execution delays in all four of his concurrences to the denial of
124 Chessman v. Dickson, 275 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1960). A subsequent case
interprets this proposition as “distinguish[ing] between innocent delays and delays
caused by a defendant’s dilatory tactics.” Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 928 (4th Cir.
1995).
125 Richmond v. Ricketts, 640 F. Supp. 767, 803 (D. Ariz. 1986). For a brief
discussion of Chessman, see text accompanying notes 79–80.
126 Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d 1473, 1491 (9th Cir. 1992).
127 Id. (quoting Andrews v. Shulsen, 600 F. Supp. 408, 431 (D. Utah 1984)). The
prisoner in Andrews did not make a Lackey claim, but instead argued that the repeated
setting and staying of execution dates violated the Eighth Amendment. See Andrews v.
Shulsen, 600 F. Supp. 408, 431 (D. Utah 1984).
128 Free v. Peters, 50 F.3d 1362, 1362 (7th Cir. 1995).
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certiorari of Lackey claims. In Knight v. Florida, Justice Thomas
referred to the prisoner as “avail[ing] himself of the panoply of
appellate and collateral procedures and then complain[ing] when his
execution is delayed.”129 In Foster v. Florida, Justice Thomas observed
that the “[p]etitioner could long ago have ended his ‘anxieties and
uncertainties’ by submitting to what the people of Florida have
deemed him to deserve: execution.”130 In Thompson v. McNeil, Justice
Thomas stressed that the “petitioner chose to challenge his death
sentence”131 and quoted from a Fourth Circuit concurring opinion:
“[i]t makes ‘a mockery of our system of justice . . . for a convicted
murderer, who, through his own interminable efforts of delay . . . has
secured the almost-indefinite postponement of his sentence, to then
claim that the almost-indefinite postponement renders his sentence
unconstitutional.’”132 Finally, in Johnson v. Bredesen, Justice Thomas
reiterated the above statement from Knight.133
c.

Post-Lackey Precedent

Perhaps the most influential American case deciding a Lackey claim
is McKenzie v. Day.134 In denying the prisoner’s claim that execution
following a twenty-year delay violates the Eighth Amendment,
McKenzie stated that “[t]he delay has been caused by the fact that
McKenzie has availed himself of [opportunities to challenge his
sentence].”135 McKenzie emphasized that delay is the choice of the
prisoner:
A number of death row inmates have refused to avail
themselves of avenues of review precisely to avoid this ordeal
[of decades on death row]. This option is available to anyone
sentenced to die, and to the extent petitioners choose to delay
execution in the hope of obtaining relief, that is a choice they
make for themselves.136

129

Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990 (1999).
Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 991 (2002) (quoting id. at 993 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari)) (internal citation omitted).
131 Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1117 (2009).
132 Id. (quoting Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 933 (4th Cir. 1995)).
133 See Johnson v. Bredesen, 558 U.S. 1067, 1071 (2009).
134 57 F.3d 1461 (9th Cir. 1995).
135 Id. at 1466-67.
136 Id. at 1470 n.21.
130
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Numerous other federal circuit court cases have denied Lackey claims
by invoking the prisoner choice argument,137 as well as federal district
court cases138 and state cases.139
d.

Criticisms

The gradations of disagreement with the prisoner choice argument,
from narrowest to broadest, are as follows. First, prisoners should not

137 See, e.g., Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 946, 957 n.10 (9th Cir. 2006)
(distinguishing the prisoner’s claim from other cases where “much of the delay had
been due to the State’s own errors”); Chambers v. Bowersox, 157 F.3d 560, 570 (8th
Cir. 1998) (“Delay has come about because Chambers . . . has contested the
judgments against him.”); White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 1996)
(“White has had the choice of seeking further review . . . or avoiding further delay of
his execution by not petitioning for further review . . . .”); Stafford v. Ward, 59 F.3d
1025, 1028 n.5 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[B]ecause Appellant chose to avail himself of stays
to pursue these avenues of review, they may not be used to support an Eighth
Amendment claim.”); Fearance v. Scott, 56 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Fearance
was not the unwilling victim of a Bleak House-like procedural system hopelessly
bogged down; at every turn, he . . . sought extensions of time, hearings and
reconsiderations.”); Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 933 (1995) (“The delay of which he
[the prisoner] now complains is a direct consequence of his own litigation strategy
. . . .”); Porter v. Singletary, 49 F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1995) (“We note that
Porter has proffered no evidence to establish that delays in his case have been
attributable to negligence or deliberate action of the state.”).
138 See, e.g., Booker v. McNeil, No. 1:08cv143/RS, 2010 WL 3942866, at *38 n.21
(N.D. Fla. Oct. 5, 2010) (“[N]o federal or state courts have accepted [the prisoner’s
claim] . . . especially where both parties bear responsibility for the long delay.”);
Hairston v. Paskett, No. CV-00-303-S-BLW, 2008 WL 3874614, at *8 (D. Idaho Aug.
15, 2008) (“[P]rolonged incarceration under a sentence of death does not offend the
Eighth Amendment, particularly when the delay results from prisoners[’] unsuccessful
pursuit of collateral relief and not from the State’s dilatory tactics.”); United States ex
rel Delvecchio v. Ill. Dep’t of Corrs., No. 95C6637, 1995 WL 688675, at *8 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 17, 1995) (“Petitioner has extended the time . . . of his execution and therefore,
any additional punishment caused by the delay is attributable to the petitioner.”).
139 See, e.g., State v. Schackart, 947 P.2d 315, 336 (Ariz. 1997) (“[D]efendant’s
claim that the state is solely responsible for the delays in this case is inaccurate.”);
People v. Hill, 839 P.2d 984, 1017 (Cal. 1992) (“Defendant, however, does not — and
in good faith cannot — allege even the slightest undue delay by the state in this
case.”); Valle v. State, 70 So. 3d 530, 552 (Fla. 2011) (“Valle ‘cannot now contend that
his punishment has been illegally prolonged because the delay in carrying out his
sentence is in large part due to his own actions in challenging his conviction[s] and
sentence.’” (quoting Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072, 1085 (Fla. 2008))); Bieghler
v. State, 839 N.E.2d 691, 697 (Ind. 2005) (“[T]he time between his conviction and the
approaching execution flows from his having availed himself of the appeals process.”);
State v. Austin, 87 S.W.3d 447, 486 (Tenn. 2002) (“As in most cases, the delay in the
instant case was caused in large part by numerous appeals and collateral attacks
lodged by the Appellant.”).

2016]

Absurdity and Excessively Delayed Executions

865

be responsible for intentional delays by the State.140 Second, prisoners
should not be responsible for delays caused by automatic, mandated
appeals.141 Third, prisoners should not be responsible for delays
incurred because of negligence by the State.142 Some courts denying
Lackey claims imply disagreement with the prisoner choice argument
to this limited extent but inevitably fail to find appreciable delays from
these sources.143 Fourth, prisoners should not be responsible for
delays stemming from discretionary, but successful post-conviction
review revealing the State’s employment of constitutionally defective
procedures.144 Fifth, prisoners should not be responsible for delays
due to discretionary and unsuccessful review that was nonetheless
legitimate and non-frivolous. This appears to be the position of Justice
Stevens145 as well as most supporters of the Lackey claim,146 but it has
140 See, e.g., Chambers, 157 F.3d at 570 (“[T]here is no evidence . . . that the State
has deliberately sought . . . to prolong the time before it could secure a valid
conviction and execute him.”); McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1466 (“[T]he State of Montana
has [not] set up a scheme to prolong the period of incarceration . . . .”).
141 See, e.g., Free v. Peters, 50 F.3d 1362, 1362 (7th Cir. 1995) (denying Lackey
claim based on distinguishing between delays incurred during prisoner’s mandatory
and discretionary appeals).
142 See, e.g., White, 79 F.3d at 439 (“[Prisoner] does not offer any evidence that
Texas’ delay in considering his petition was . . . negligent.”); Porter, 49 F.3d at 1485
(“We note that [the prisoner] has proffered no evidence to establish that delays in his
case have been attributable to negligence . . . of the state.”).
143 See cases cited supra notes 140 and 142.
144 See, e.g., Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 945 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (“[The prisoner] has experienced that [twenty-three year]
delay because of the State’s own faulty procedures and not because of frivolous
appeals on his own part.”); State v. Smith, 931 P.2d 1272, 1291 (Mont. 1996)
(Leapheart, J., concurring) (rejecting prisoner fault argument where prisoner has been
successful in appeals because “the blame properly rests with the State or the courts”).
145 In Lackey, Justice Stevens acknowledged that some types of prisoner
responsibility for delay was arguably relevant. Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1047
(1995) (respecting denial of certiorari) (“There may well be constitutional significance
to the reasons for the various delays that have occurred in petitioner’s case.”
(emphasis added)). He noted that:

“It may be appropriate to distinguish” among the following three reasons for
delay:
“(a) a petitioner’s abuse of the judicial system by . . . repetitive,
frivolous filings; (b) a petitioner’s legitimate exercise of his right to
review; and (c) negligence or deliberate action by the State. Thus,
though English cases indicate that the prisoner should not be held
responsible for delays occurring in the latter two categories, it is at least
arguable that some portion of the time that has elapsed since this
petitioner was first sentenced to death in 1978 should be excluded from
the calculus.”
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been unpersuasive to nearly all courts.147 Sixth, the prisoner choice
argument lacks a convincing rationale explaining its relevance.148
Seventh, reflecting the broadest disagreement, prisoner choice is
irrelevant149 because the years of death row incarceration suffered by
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Perhaps Justice Stevens conceded that at
least some types of prisoner fault “may” be and “arguabl[y]” is relevant, in order to
acknowledge an important English case decided shortly before Lackey (Pratt v. Att’y
Gen. of Jamaica, [1994] 2 A.C. 1 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Jam.)). Pratt generally
found delay the responsibility of the State. Id. at 33 (“[F]ault is to be attributed to the
appellate system that permits such delay and not to the prisoner who takes advantage
of it.”). But as to “frivolous and time wasting resort to legal procedures which amount
to an abuse of process[,] the defendant cannot be allowed to take advantage of the
delay.” Id. at 29-30. In his subsequent memorandums respecting denial of certiorari of
Lackey claims, Justice Stevens did stress that the prisoners were not at fault, or not
entirely at fault, for the delays. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bredesen, 558 U.S. 1067, 1067
(2009) (“[Petitioner] bears little, if any, responsibility for this delay.”).
146 See, e.g., People v. Simms, 736 N.E.2d 1092, 1143 (Ill. 2000) (Harrison, C.J.,
dissenting) (rejecting prisoner fault argument and noting that nearly all Lackey claims
are non-frivolous); Dwight Aarons, Getting Out of This Mess: Steps Toward Addressing
and Avoiding Inordinate Delay in Capital Cases, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 22
(1998) (“[D]efective [state] processing systems are the true cause of most of the delay
in capital cases.”); Newton, Slow Wheels, supra note 3, at 64 (“[T]he delays occasioned
by such discretionary appeals, at least non-frivolous ones, should not be attributed to
inmates who pursue such appeals.”); Jeremy Root, Note, Cruel and Unusual
Punishment: A Reconsideration of the Lackey Claim, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
281, 299 (2001–2002) (“Frivolous petitions account for an infinitesimal fraction of
the typical period of delay . . . .”).
147 The lone federal case to recognize a Lackey claim, Jones v. Chappell, rejected the
prisoner fault argument on empirical grounds, “find[ing] that much of the delay in
California’s postconviction review process is created by the State itself, not by inmates’
own interminable efforts to delay.” Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1066
(C.D. Cal. 2014).
148 See Russell L. Christopher, The Irrelevance of Prisoner Fault for Excessively
Delayed Executions, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 14-15 (2015) (contending that the
argument lacks an explicit rationale and that neither of its possible rationales —
analogizing to attribution of fault in the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right context
and waiver of the Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment —
are persuasive).
149 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 37, at 105-06 (“[I]t should not matter whether the
inmate was the partial cause of his own delayed execution. The justice system does
not allow inmates the right to starve themselves or to otherwise engage in self-harm.
Prisoners should similarly be barred from punishing themselves with additional time
on death row.”); Ryan S. Hedges, Note, Justices Blind: How the Rehnquist Court’s Refusal
to Hear a Claim for Inordinate Delay of Execution Undermines Its Death Penalty
Jurisprudence, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 577, 581 (2001) (“[D]elay of execution, regardless of
who is responsible and whether it is intentional or inadvertent . . . giv[es] rise to a
claim for cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.”).
Like Justice Stevens, Justice Breyer’s view of the prisoner fault argument is not
entirely clear. In individual cases he has maintained that delay was the fault of the
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prisoners is the same regardless of whether the State or the prisoner is
responsible.150
2.

Post-Conviction Review Necessary for Accuracy and Fairness

In addition to the prisoner choice argument, many courts reject
Lackey claims on the basis that lengthy post-conviction review is
necessary to ensure accuracy and fairness.151 Implicit in this argument is
the conclusion that because accuracy and fairness are constitutionally
valuable, any consequence of that pursuit of accuracy and fairness must
be constitutionally acceptable. Delay between sentencing and execution
is such a consequence. Therefore, such delay must be constitutionally
acceptable. In short, accuracy trumps speed.152
Federal courts’ invocation of this argument perhaps began with the
District Court of Arizona in 1986 in Richmond v. Ricketts.153 Ricketts
rejected that a twelve-year-delay constituted cruel and unusual
punishment because “it is better to take the time to consider each
issue [presented by the prisoner] thoroughly rather than quickly
dispatching someone to the gas chamber.”154 Echoing this theme of
delays stemming from the quest for accuracy and fairness, the Ninth
State and not the defendant. See infra note 236 and accompanying text. While he
never explicitly states that prisoner fault is irrelevant, Justice Breyer comes close: “one
cannot realistically expect a defendant condemned to death to refrain from fighting for
his life by seeking to use whatever procedures the law allows.” Valle v. Florida, 132 S.
Ct. 1, 2 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of stay).
150 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 289 n.37 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (“The State, of course, does not purposely impose the lengthy waiting
period . . . . The impact upon the individual is not the less severe on that account.”);
People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 895 (Cal. 1972) (“An appellant’s insistence on
receiving the benefits of appellate review . . . does not render the lengthy period of
impending execution any less torturous or exempt such cruelty from constitutional
proscription.”); Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1283 (Mass.
1980) (“[T]hat the delay may be due to the defendant’s insistence on exercising his
appellate rights does not mitigate the severity of the impact on the condemned
individual . . . from inhuman treatment.”); Vatheeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu,
(1983) 2 S.C.R. 348, 353 (India) (“We think that the cause of the delay is immaterial
when the sentence is death. Be the cause for the delay, the time necessary for
appeal . . . or some other cause for which the accused himself may be responsible, it
would not alter the dehumanising character of the delay.”).
151 See, e.g., Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1065 (“[C]ourts often rely on two
justifications for rejecting the [Lackey claim]: first . . . delay is reasonably related
to . . . safeguard[ing] the inmate’s constitutional rights by ensuring the accuracy of
[the] death . . . sentence . . . .”); see also supra note 14.
152 See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text.
153 640 F. Supp. 767 (D. Ariz. 1986).
154 Id. at 803.
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Circuit, in McKenzie v. Day, contended that “[t]he delay has been
caused by the fact that McKenzie [the prisoner] has availed himself of
procedures our law provides to make sure that executions are carried
out only in appropriate circumstances.”155 The court in McKenzie
explained that “most of these procedural safeguards have been
imposed by the Supreme Court in recognition of the fact that the
common law practice of imposing swift and certain executions could
result in arbitrariness and error in carrying out the death penalty.”156
The Sixth Circuit, in Chambers v. Bowersox, similarly declared that
“delay, in large part, is a function of the desire of our courts, state and
federal, to get it right, to explore exhaustively, or at least sufficiently,
any argument that might save someone’s life.”157 In White v. Johnson,
the Fifth Circuit rejected a Lackey claim based on a seventeen-year
delay because the prisoner’s “claim demands that capital punishment
be carried out quickly in spite of the importance of thorough
factfinding in capital cases and the state’s compelling interest in
ensuring that it does not execute innocent defendants.”158 Perhaps the
last federal circuit case to emphasize this argument, Thompson v.
Secretary for the Department of Corrections, denied a thirty-one year
stay on death row as violating the Eighth Amendment by quoting
approvingly the above language from Chambers.159
State courts rejecting Lackey claims also invoke this argument. The
Supreme Court of Montana quoted approvingly McKenzie’s argument
that “the cause for the delay . . . [was that the prisoner] ‘availed
himself of procedures our law provides to ensure that executions are
carried out only in appropriate circumstances.’”160 The Supreme Court
of Nebraska quoted approvingly the identical language from
McKenzie.161 The Supreme Court of Illinois quoted approvingly the

155

McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1466-67 (9th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1467.
157 Chambers v. Bowersox, 157 F.3d 560, 570 (8th Cir. 1998).
158 White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 438 (5th Cir. 1996); accord id. at 440 (“On the
merits, these claims would likewise fail because the delay that White complains of
arises from post-conviction proceedings which exist to protect White and which
White, himself, requested when he petitioned for habeas relief.”).
159 Thompson v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 517 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008)
(“[D]eath row delays do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment because delay
results from the ‘desire of our courts, state and federal, to get it right, to explore . . .
any argument that might save someone’s life.’” (quoting Chambers, 157 F.3d at 570)).
160 State v. Smith, 931 P.2d 1272, 1288 (Mont. 1996) (quoting McKenzie, 57 F.3d
at 1466-67).
161 State v. Moore, 591 N.W.2d 86, 94 (Neb. 1999).
156
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above language from Chambers.162 The Indiana Supreme Court in
Moore v. State, agreed with the reasoning of the above Nebraska
decision163 and concluded that “[t]o ensure the just administration of
the death penalty the value of speed should not trump the value of
accuracy.”164 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Louisiana rejected a
Lackey claim by maintaining that “[t]he value of speed should not
trump the value of accuracy.”165
3.

Post-Conviction Review Necessary Under Eighth Amendment

The third principal argument used to reject Lackey claims is that
delays that are a consequence of compliance with the Eighth
Amendment or other constitutional mandates cannot be
unconstitutional.166 The clearest and most concise statement of this
argument167 is from McKenzie v. Day,168 the first Ninth Circuit postLackey decision. McKenzie noted that the twenty-year delay “is a
consequence of our evolving standards of decency, which prompt us
to provide death row inmates with ample opportunities to contest
their convictions and sentences.”169 Because evolving standards of
decency are a measure of the constitutionality of capital punishment
under the Eighth Amendment,170 McKenzie is, in effect, declaring that
delay is a product of satisfying the Eighth Amendment. In rejecting the
prisoner’s claim of cruel and unusual punishment, the court stated,
“We cannot conclude that delays caused by satisfying the Eighth
Amendment themselves violate it.”171
Other federal circuit courts have made similar arguments. In White
v. Johnson, the Fifth Circuit rejected the prisoner’s Lackey claim
162

People v. Simms, 736 N.E.2d 1092, 1141 (Ill. 2000).
See Moore v. State, 771 N.E.2d 46, 54 (Ind. 2002).
164 Id. at 55.
165 State v. Sparks, 68 So. 3d 435, 493 (La. 2011). For criticism of this argument,
see infra notes 178–80 and accompanying text.
166 See, e.g., Karl S. Myers, Comment, Practical Lackey: The Impact of Holding
Execution After a Long Stay on Death Row Unconstitutional Under Lackey v. Texas, 106
DICK. L. REV. 647, 661 (2002) (“[T]here are several fundamental reasons why . . . courts
have rejected Lackey claims: . . . upholding the claim would result in an inconsistency
with other Eighth Amendment requirements . . . .”); see also supra note 14.
167 For Justice Thomas’ articulation of a version of this argument, see infra note 232.
168 McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting Lackey claim).
169 Id. at 1467.
170 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (declaring that punishment which
does not satisfy “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society” may be unconstitutionally cruel and unusual).
171 McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1467.
163
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involving seventeen years on death row because “there are compelling
justifications for the delay between conviction and the execution of a
death sentence. The state . . . [has an] interest in insuring that those
who are executed receive fair trials with constitutionally mandated
safeguards.”172 Two other circuit courts quoted approvingly White’s
argument that such delays stem from compliance with
“‘constitutionally mandated safeguards.’”173
State courts have also utilized the argument in rejecting Lackey
claims. In a decision predating McKenzie, the California Supreme
Court held that “[t]he existence of an automatic appeal under state
law [that caused significant delay and prolonged the prisoner’s stay on
death row] is not a constitutional defect; it is a constitutional
safeguard.”174 That is, delays caused by constitutional safeguards
cannot be a constitutional defect. Citing McKenzie and White, the
Supreme Court of Arkansas stated that “the very nature of capital
litigation . . . suggests that delay . . . is the product of evolving
standards of decency.”175 Also finding the reasoning of McKenzie and
White persuasive, another California Supreme decision declared that
“the delays caused by satisfying the Eighth Amendment cannot violate
it.”176 The Supreme Court of Nebraska advanced this even more
forcefully: “It would be a mockery of justice to conclude that delays
caused by satisfying the Eighth Amendment themselves violate it.”177
Because this argument and the previous argument (delay is a
consequence of post-conviction review that is necessary for accuracy
and fairness) are so similar, their criticisms tend to run together. The
central criticism is that prisoners have two independent rights — the
right to review their sentences and the right against cruel and unusual
punishment — neither of which satisfies or precludes the other.178
172

White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 1996).
Thompson v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 517 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008)
(quoting White, 79 F.3d at 439); Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 946, 959 (9th Cir. 2006)
(quoting White, 79 F.3d at 439).
174 People v. Hill, 839 P.2d 984, 1017 (Cal. 1992) (en banc).
175 Hill v. State, 962 S.W.2d 762, 767 (Ark. 1998).
176 People v. Frye, 959 P.2d 183, 262-63 (Cal. 1998).
177 State v. Moore, 591 N.W.2d 86, 94 (Neb. 1999).
178 See, e.g., State v. Smith, 931 P.2d 1272, 1292 (Mont. 1996) (Leaphart, J.,
concurring) (“I see no simple answer to the conundrum which results from the
conflict between a defendant’s right to due process and appellate review and his right
to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.”); DAVID PANNICK, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
THE DEATH PENALTY 84 (1982) (“[A] death sentence becomes unconstitutionally cruel
unless carried out within a reasonable time . . . and without the incidental
infringement of any of the other rights (such as the right to appeal against conviction
173
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Justice Brennan was perhaps the first to voice this criticism: “The right
not to be subjected to inhuman treatment [prolonged death row
incarceration] cannot, of course, be played off against the right to
pursue due process of law.”179 That is, prisoners have the right to both
speed and accuracy.180 Courts denying Lackey claims have ignored
these criticisms, however, maintaining that prisoners must choose
between speed and accuracy.181 The next Part shows that the trio is
unsound in a way that is not so easily ignored.
II.

THE TRIO ABSURDLY DENIES CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

This Part demonstrates that the trio would deny numerous clearly
existing constitutional rights; by generating such absurd
consequences, the trio is unsound.182 Understanding the following
and sentence) guaranteed by due process.”); Newton, Slow Wheels, supra note 3, at 64
(“[I]t is axiomatic in our legal system that a person should not have to waive one
constitutional right in order to exercise another.”); Jessica Feldman, Comment, A
Death Row Incarceration Calculus: When Prolonged Death Row Imprisonment Becomes
Unconstitutional, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 187, 218 (1999) (“Requiring a prisoner to
forgo either the right to appeal his sentence or an Eighth Amendment claim
[unconstitutionally] forces the prisoner to choose the protection of one constitutional
guarantee over another.”); Root, supra note 146, at 326 (“To suggest that a citizen
loses the protection of the Eighth Amendment because he chooses to pursue appellate
review of his capital sentence seems highly improper.”).
179 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 289 n.37 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring);
accord Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1283 (Mass. 1980)
(“[T]he right to pursue due process of law must not be set off against the right to be
free from inhuman treatment.”).
180 See Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1067 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (rejecting
that a prisoner must choose between speed and accuracy); Rapaport, supra note 75, at
1126-27 (“[T]he proper way to frame the Eighth Amendment debate is not as a choice
between dispatch and delay . . . .”).
181 See, e.g., Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 991 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in
denial of certiorari) (“Petitioner could long ago have ended his ‘anxieties and
uncertainties’ by submitting to what the people of Florida have deemed him to
deserve: execution.” (quoting id. at 993 (Breyer, J., dissenting to denial of certiorari))).
182 The reductio ad absurdum method of argument may informally be explained as
follows:
The technique is particularly powerful because it allows us, for the purpose
of argument, to grant for a moment what our opponent believes. We say,
‘Let’s suppose you are right. What would be the consequences?’ If we can
then show the consequences are absurd, we can force the opponent to admit
something is wrong in his or her position: ‘If you believe X, you must believe
Y. Yet Y is absurd. So, do you really believe X?’
BAGGINI & FOSL, supra note 19, at 117-18. For the most recent use of the reductio ad
absurdum method of proof in a Supreme Court opinion, see Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing, 131
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underlying structure of the trio helps to see how the trio could
absurdly deny clearly existing constitutional rights: If X is (i) chosen
by the defendant/prisoner, (ii) necessary for accuracy and fairness, and
(iii) necessary to satisfy the Constitution, then any consequence of X
is necessarily constitutional. The trio would therefore deny any
constitutional right Y that is violated by the consequences of X. So for
any two constitutional rights, X and Y, in which the consequences of
exercising X violate Y, the trio would deny constitutional right Y.
For an example, as discussed in the Introduction,183 the Sixth
Amendment right to the assistance of counsel (X) is chosen by the
defendant, necessary for accuracy and fairness, and necessary to satisfy
the Constitution. As a consequence of the exercise of the right to the
assistance of counsel, ineffectiveness of counsel is, according to the
trio, necessarily constitutional. But there is also a Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel (Y). Because the consequences
of exercising the right to counsel are necessarily constitutional, despite
violating the right to the effective assistance of counsel, the trio
absurdly denies the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance
of counsel.
This Part applies the trio to six additional contexts involving
constitutional rights that share the above X/Y structure or relationship.
The trio absurdly denies the following long-standing, clearly existing
constitutional rights expressly guaranteed by the Supreme Court: (i)
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury pool representative of the
community, (ii) the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to an
impartial jury, (iii) the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause right against the State’s discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges of prospective jurors, (iv) the Fifth Amendment right to a
no-adverse-inference jury instruction regarding a defendant choosing
not to testify, (v) the Fifth Amendment right against negative
S. Ct. 2567, 2590 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). For notable examples of its use
by the philosophers Plato, Immanuel Kant, and St. Thomas Aquinas, see SALMON,
supra note 19, at 31-32, 48-49.
More informally, the reductio ad absurdum method of argument is sometimes termed
“proving too much.” See Moti Mizrahi, On Proving Too Much, 28 ACTA ANALYTICA 353,
355 (2013) (discussing the relationship between the two forms of argument). To
prove too much is simply “to make an overbroad argument.” BRYAN A. GARNER, A
DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 710 (2d ed. 1995). For a recent example of its
use in support of the constitutionality of capital punishment, see Hall v. Florida, 134
S. Ct. 1986, 2012 n.14 (2014) (Alito, J., dissenting). The “proves too much” method
of argument has also been employed by a court to deny a Lackey claim. See Fearance
v. Scott, 56 F.3d 633, 636-37 (5th Cir. 1995).
183 See supra text accompanying notes 20–29.
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comment to the jury regarding a defendant choosing not to testify, and
(vi) the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.184 Finally, this Part
presents and counters four possible objections to this Part’s claim that
the trio is unsound.
A. No Sixth Amendment Right to Representative Jury Pool
Suppose a defendant invokes her Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial.185 Though women comprise roughly half of the population of the
community where the trial occurs, the State’s jury-selection process
systematically excludes women. Out of the nearly 200 persons in the
jury pool for the defendant’s trial, none were women. After the allmale jury convicts, the defendant appeals claiming that her right to a
jury pool representative of and reflecting a fair cross-section of the
community was violated based on the Supreme Court decision of
Taylor v. Louisiana.186 As Taylor explained, “[t]he unmistakable
import of this Court’s opinions, at least since 1940 . . . and not
repudiated by intervening decisions, is that the selection of a petit jury
from a representative cross section of the community is an essential
component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.”187 The
hypothetical appellate court denies the Taylor claim based on the
following application, to this Sixth Amendment context, of the trio.
First, the defendant chose trial by jury.188 As chosen by the
defendant, a consequence of that choice — a non-representative jury
pool — is attributable to the defendant, not the State.189 It makes a
184 It might seem like overkill to demonstrate that the trio absurdly denies seven
clearly existing constitutional rights, rather than just a few. But it is important to show
the extent of the trio’s conflict with existing constitutional rights. As discussed in an
anticipated objection to this Part’s claim, see infra Part II.G.2, the greater the extent of
this conflict the more difficult it is for proponents of the trio to argue that the trio is
right and the Supreme Court was wrong in recognizing constitutional rights
conflicting with the trio.
185 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a . . . trial, by . . . jury . . . .”). Duncan v. Louisiana extended this right to
defendants in state courts. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (“Because
we believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme
of justice, we hold that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in
all criminal cases which — were they to be tried in a federal court — would come
within the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee.”).
186 419 U.S. 522, 530-32 (1975) (holding that systematically excluding women
from the jury pool violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury pool
reflecting a fair-cross section of the community).
187 Id. at 528 (citing Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940)).
188 Compare statement in text, with supra note 6 and accompanying text.
189 Compare statement in text, with supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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mockery of our system of justice for a defendant to invoke the right to
a jury trial and, after that jury trial is furnished, then to complain that
the non-representativeness of the jury pool renders her conviction
unconstitutional.190 Second, the right to a jury trial is necessary for
accuracy and fairness.191 A consequence of what is necessary to ensure
accuracy and fairness — a non-representative jury pool — must be
constitutionally permissible.192 Providing a jury trial cannot result in a
Sixth Amendment violation because it stems from the desire of our
courts, state and federal, to get it right, to furnish any assistance that
might prevent a wrongful conviction.193 Third, supplying a jury trial is
necessary to satisfy the Sixth Amendment.194 It would be a mockery of
justice for a non-representative jury pool caused by satisfying the Sixth
Amendment to violate it.195
The trio denies the Sixth Amendment right to a jury pool
representative of and reflecting a fair cross-section of the community.
The trio did not deny the defendant’s Sixth Amendment claim because
she did receive a representative jury pool. Nor did the trio deny the
claim because the defendant failed to meet her evidentiary burden in
proving non-representativeness. Nor did the trio deny her claim
because of some defendant-specific reason that she lacked the Sixth
Amendment right. Rather, the trio establishes that no defendant has a
right to a representative jury pool.
But, of course, all defendants do have a Sixth Amendment right to a
jury pool representative of and reflecting a fair cross-section of the
community. In affirming this right, the Supreme Court in Taylor (on
facts almost identical to this hypothetical) held “that the fair crosssection requirement is violated by the systematic exclusion of women,
who in the judicial district involved here amounted to 53% of the
citizens eligible for jury service. . . . [If women] are systematically
eliminated from jury panels, the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross-section
requirement cannot be satisfied.”196 By denying a clearly existing Sixth
Amendment right, the trio leads to an absurd or false conclusion. By
leading to an absurd or false conclusion, the trio is unsound.
190

Compare statement in text, with supra note 8 and accompanying text.
Compare statement in text, with supra note 9 and accompanying text. For the
Supreme Court’s view that jury trials are necessary for accuracy and fairness, see
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
192 Compare statement in text, with supra note 10 and accompanying text.
193 Compare statement in text, with supra note 11 and accompanying text.
194 Compare statement in text, with supra note 12 and accompanying text.
195 Compare statement in text, with supra note 13 and accompanying text.
196 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531 (1975).
191
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B. No Sixth/Fourteenth Amendment Right to an Impartial Jury
Suppose a defendant invokes his Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial.197 During voir dire, a prospective juror reveals his bias and
partiality by declaring that he would vote for the death penalty
without regard to mitigating evidence presented at the capital
sentencing hearing. The defendant exercises a “for cause” challenge
requesting the prospective juror’s exclusion from serving on the jury.
The trial court refuses and empanels the biased prospective juror on
the jury. After the jury convicts and imposes a death sentence, the
defendant appeals claiming a violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment right to an impartial jury.198
The hypothetical appellate court denies the claim based on the
following application, to this Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment
context, of the trio.199 First, the defendant chose trial by jury. As
chosen by the defendant, a consequence of that choice — a biased jury
— is attributable to the defendant, not the State. It makes a mockery
of our system of justice for a defendant to invoke the right to a jury
trial and, after that jury trial is furnished, then to complain that the
partiality of the jury renders his conviction unconstitutional. Second,
the right to a jury trial is necessary for accuracy and fairness. A
consequence of what is necessary to ensure accuracy and fairness — a
biased jury — must be constitutionally permissible. Providing a trial
by jury cannot result in a Sixth Amendment violation because it stems
from the desire of our courts, state and federal, to get it right, to
furnish any assistance that might prevent a wrongful conviction.
Third, supplying a trial by jury is necessary to satisfy the Sixth
Amendment. It would be a mockery of justice for a biased jury caused
by satisfying the Sixth Amendment to violate it.
The trio denies the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to an
impartial jury. But, of course, all defendants do have a constitutional
right to an impartial jury. The literal text of the Sixth Amendment
provides this right and the Supreme Court has construed the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause to independently supply
197

See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a . . . trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”); see Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719,
726 (1992) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause itself independently
[from the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury] required the impartiality of any
jury . . . .”); id. at 727 (“[D]ue process alone has long demanded that . . . the jury must
stand impartial and indifferent to the extent commanded by the Sixth Amendment.”).
199 For the original formulations of these arguments, see supra notes 6–13 and
accompanying text. For a more comprehensive discussion of the trio, see supra Part I.C.
198
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this right.200 In Morgan v. Illinois, on similar facts as the above
hypothetical, the Court held that defendants do have a right to an
impartial jury under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause.201 By absurdly denying a clearly existing Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment right, the trio is unsound.
C. No Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause Right Against
Discriminatory Peremptory Challenges
Suppose a defendant invokes her Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial.202 During voir dire, the prosecutor employs all of her peremptory
challenges to exclude African-Americans from serving on the jury. The
defendant objects but the trial court overrules the defendant’s
objection, insisting that peremptory challenges may be used to exclude
anyone for any reason. After the all-white jury convicts, the defendant
appeals claiming that her Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause right203 against the prosecution’s use of race-based peremptory
challenges was violated based on the Supreme Court’s decision in
Batson v. Kentucky.204 As Batson explained, “[m]ore than a century
ago, the Court decided that the State denies a black defendant equal
protection of the laws when it puts him on trial before a jury from
which members of his race have been purposefully excluded.”205
The hypothetical appellate court denies the defendant’s claim based
on the following application, to this Fourteenth Amendment context,
of the trio.206 First, the defendant chose trial by jury. As chosen by the
defendant, a consequence of that choice — racial discrimination in
jury selection — is attributable to the defendant, not the State. It
makes a mockery of our system of justice for a defendant to invoke the
right to a jury trial and, after that jury trial is furnished, then to
complain that the discriminatory practices in jury selection renders
200

See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729 (“A juror who will automatically vote for the death
penalty in every case [violates] . . . the requirement of impartiality embodied in the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
202 See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
203 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
204 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause
forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their
race . . . .”).
205 Id. at 85 (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880)).
206 For the original formulations of these arguments, see supra notes 6–13 and
accompanying text. For a more comprehensive discussion of the trio, see supra Part I.C.
201
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her conviction unconstitutional. Second, the right to a jury trial is
necessary for accuracy and fairness. A consequence of what is
necessary to ensure accuracy and fairness — racial discrimination in
jury selection — must be constitutionally permissible. Providing a trial
by jury cannot result in a Fourteenth Amendment violation because it
stems from the desire of our courts, state and federal, to get it right, to
furnish any assistance that might prevent a wrongful conviction.
Third, supplying a trial by jury is necessary to satisfy the Sixth
Amendment. It would be a mockery of justice for racial discrimination
in jury selection caused by satisfying the Sixth Amendment to violate
the Constitution.
The trio denies the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause
right against the prosecution’s use of race-based peremptory
challenges. But, of course, all defendants do have this Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause right. The Supreme Court
reaffirmed this right in Swain v. Alabama in 1965207 and held in Batson
in 1986 (on facts similar to that of the hypothetical) that a
prosecutor’s use of race-based peremptory challenges violates the
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection clause.208 By absurdly
denying a clearly existing Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause right, the trio is unsound.
D. No Fifth Amendment Right to a No-Adverse-Inference Jury
Instruction Regarding Defendant’s Silence
Suppose a defendant invokes his Fifth Amendment right, choosing
not to testify in his defense.209 The defendant requests that the trial
court instruct the jury not to draw a negative inference from his failure
to testify. The trial court refuses. After the defendant is convicted, the
defendant appeals claiming a violation of his Fifth Amendment

207 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 203-04 (1965) (“[A] State’s purposeful or
deliberate denial to Negroes on account of race of participation as jurors in the
administration of justice violates the Equal Protection Clause. . . . And [this principle]
has been consistently and repeatedly applied in many cases coming before this
Court.”).
208 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 100 (“[P]etitioner made a timely objection to the
prosecutor’s removal of all black persons on the venire. Because the trial court flatly
rejected the objection without requiring the prosecutor to give an explanation for his
action, we remand this case for further proceedings.”).
209 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself . . . .”).
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privilege against self-incrimination based on the Supreme Court
decision of Carter v. Kentucky.210
The hypothetical appellate court denies his claim by the following
application, to this Fifth Amendment context, of the trio.211 First, the
defendant chose not to testify. As chosen by the defendant, a
consequence of that choice — a court’s refusal to issue a no-adverseinference jury instruction — is attributable to the defendant, not the
State. It makes a mockery of our system of justice for a defendant to
choose to take advantage of the right not to testify and, after that right
is granted, then to complain that a court’s refusal to issue a noadverse-inference jury instruction renders his conviction
unconstitutional. Second, the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination is necessary to ensure accuracy and fairness.212 A
consequence of what is necessary to ensure accuracy and fairness — a
court’s refusal to issue a no-adverse-inference jury instruction — must
be constitutionally permissible. Providing the opportunity for a
defendant not to testify cannot result in a Fifth Amendment violation
because the right against self-incrimination stems from the desire of
our courts, state and federal, to get it right, to furnish any assistance
that might prevent a wrongful conviction. Third, allowing defendants
to not testify in their own defense is necessary to satisfy the Fifth
Amendment. It would be a mockery of justice for a court’s refusal to
issue a no-adverse-inference jury instruction that is caused by
satisfying the Fifth Amendment to violate it.
The trio denies the Fifth Amendment right to a no-adverse-inference
jury instruction. But, of course, all defendants do have this Fifth
Amendment right. As the Court held in Carter, “the Fifth Amendment
requires that a criminal trial judge must give a ‘no-adverse-inference’
jury instruction when requested by a defendant to do so.”213 By
210 Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 300 (1981) (“The principles enunciated in
our cases construing this privilege [against compelled self-incrimination], against both
statutory and constitutional backdrops, lead unmistakably to the conclusion that the
Fifth Amendment requires that a criminal trial judge must give a ‘no-adverseinference’ jury instruction when requested by a defendant to do so.”).
211 For the original formulations of these arguments, see supra notes 6–13 and
accompanying text. For a more comprehensive discussion of the trio, see supra Part I.C.
212 See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965) (“It is not every one who can
safely venture on the witness stand, though entirely innocent . . . . Excessive timidity,
nervousness when facing others and attempting to explain transactions of a suspicious
character . . . will often confuse and embarrass him to such a degree as to increase
rather than remove prejudices against him.” (quoting Wilson v. United States, 149
U.S. 60, 66 (1893)).
213 Carter, 450 U.S. at 300.
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absurdly denying a clearly existing Fifth Amendment right, the trio is
unsound.
E. No Fifth Amendment Right Against Negative Comments to Jury
Regarding Defendant’s Silence
Suppose a defendant invokes her Fifth Amendment right, choosing
not to testify in her defense.214 The prosecution negatively comments
to the jury regarding the defendant’s silence. After the defendant is
convicted, the defendant appeals claiming a violation of her Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination based on the Supreme
Court decision of Griffin v. California.215
The hypothetical appellate court denies the claim by the following
application, to this Fifth Amendment context, of the trio.216 First, the
defendant chose not to testify. As chosen by the defendant, a
consequence of that choice — the prosecution negatively commenting
to the jury regarding the defendant’s silence — is attributable to the
defendant, not the State. It makes a mockery of our system of justice
for a defendant to choose to take advantage of the right not to testify
and, after that right is granted, then to complain that the prosecution
negatively commenting to the jury regarding the defendant’s silence
renders her conviction unconstitutional. Second, allowing defendants
not to testify is necessary for accuracy and fairness. A consequence of
what is necessary to ensure accuracy and fairness — the prosecution
negatively commenting to the jury regarding the defendant’s silence —
must be constitutionally permissible. Providing the opportunity for a
defendant not to testify cannot result in a Fifth Amendment violation
because the right against self-incrimination stems from the desire of
our courts, state and federal, to get it right, to furnish any assistance
that might prevent a wrongful conviction. Third, allowing defendants
not to testify is necessary to satisfy the Fifth Amendment. It would be
a mockery of justice for the prosecution’s negative comment to the
jury regarding the defendant’s silence caused by satisfying the Fifth
Amendment to violate it.
The trio denies the Fifth Amendment right against the prosecution
negatively commenting to the jury regarding a defendant’s silence.
214

See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
See Griffin, 380 U.S. at 613 (holding that a court or prosecutor making negative
comments to the jury concerning the defendant’s silence violates the defendant’s Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination).
216 For the original formulations of these arguments, see supra notes 6–13 and
accompanying text. For a more comprehensive discussion of the trio, see supra Part I.C.
215
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But, of course, all defendants do have this Fifth Amendment right. As
the Court in Griffin held, “the Fifth Amendment, in its direct
application to the Federal Government and in its bearing on the States
by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids either comment by
the prosecution on the accused’s silence or instructions by the court
that such silence is evidence of guilt.”217 By absurdly denying a clearly
existing Fifth Amendment right, the trio is unsound.
F.

No Sixth Amendment Right to Speedy Trial

Suppose an indigent defendant invokes his Sixth Amendment right
to the appointment of counsel.218 Because of both numerous delays by
the trial court and limited resources within the Public Defender’s
office, the defendant is not assigned counsel until three years later.
The delay in the appointment of counsel results in his trial not
commencing until more than three years after his indictment.219 The
defendant asserts a Sixth Amendment speedy trial right violation.220
Assessments of claims of speedy trial right violations are conducted
pursuant to the Supreme Court’s balancing test in Barker v. Wingo
involving the following four factors: “Length of delay, the reason for
the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the
defendant.”221 Delays of about one year are generally considered
presumptively prejudicial.222 The trial court denies the defendant’s
claim and the defendant is convicted. The defendant appeals, claiming
a Sixth Amendment speedy trial right violation.

217

Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
219 Cf. Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1056 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (explaining
that convicted capital offenders are entitled to the assistance of appointed counsel for
their automatic appeal to the California Supreme Court but must wait “on average,
between three and five years — until counsel is appointed to represent them”); Judge
Arthur L. Alarcón, Remedies for California’s Death Row Deadlock, 80 S. CAL. L. REV.
697, 721 (2007) (citing an average delay in California of over three years for the
appointment of counsel for the automatic appeal); Scott W. Howe, Can California Save
Its Death Sentences? Will Californians Save the Expense?, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1451,
1464 (2012) (noting a wait of “‘8 to 10 years’ from sentencing for counsel to be
appointed for state habeas”).
220 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy . . . trial . . . .”).
221 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
222 E.g., Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1 (1992) (“Depending on the
nature of the charges, the lower courts have generally found postaccusation delay
‘presumptively prejudicial’ at least as it approaches one year.”).
218
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Rather than applying the Barker four-factor balancing test, the
hypothetical appellate court denies his claim by the following
application, to this Sixth Amendment context, of the trio.223 First, the
defendant chose to have appointed counsel. As chosen by the
defendant, a consequence of that choice — delay in the
commencement of the trial — is attributable to the defendant, not to
the State. It makes a mockery of our system of justice for a defendant
to request the appointment of counsel at State expense and, after that
counsel is furnished, then to complain that the very provision of that
counsel delayed his trial and violated his constitutional rights. Second,
the appointment of counsel for indigents is necessary to ensure
accuracy and fairness. A consequence of what is necessary to ensure
accuracy and fairness — delay in the commencement of the trial —
must be constitutionally permissible. The appointment of counsel
cannot result in a Sixth Amendment violation because appointment of
counsel stems from the desire of our courts, state and federal, to get it
right, to furnish any assistance that might prevent a wrongful
conviction. Third, the appointment of counsel for indigents (charged
with a felony) is necessary to satisfy the Sixth Amendment. It would
be a mockery of justice for a delay caused by satisfying the Sixth
Amendment to violate it.
The trio establishes that no indigent defendant exercising the Sixth
Amendment right to appointed counsel also has a Sixth Amendment
right to a speedy trial. But, of course, all defendants, even those
invoking the right to appointed counsel, have a Sixth Amendment
right to a speedy trial.224 The Supreme Court affirmed this right as
early as 1905,225 established the modern test for assessing claims of
violation of the right in Barker in 1972,226 and found that a defendant’s
speedy trial right was violated in Doggett v. United States in 1992.227
Moreover, the Court, in its latest decision on the speedy trial right,
223 For the original formulations of these arguments, see supra notes 6–13 and
accompanying text. For a more comprehensive discussion of the trio, see supra Part I.C.
224 The defendant in Barker had appointed counsel. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 516.
The defendant in the most recent Supreme Court case recognizing the Sixth
Amendment right to speedy trial also had appointed counsel. See Vermont v. Brillon,
556 U.S. 81, 84-85 (2009).
225 See Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 86 (1905) (“Undoubtedly a defendant is
entitled to a speedy trial . . . .”).
226 See Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 (establishing a four-factor “balancing test [that]
necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis”).
227 Doggett, 505 U.S. at 658 (“When the Government’s negligence thus causes delay
six times as long as that generally sufficient to trigger judicial review . . . the defendant
is entitled to relief [for a violation of the Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Clause].”).
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declared that delays stemming from the exercise of the right to
appointed counsel can lead to a speedy trial right violation.228 By
absurdly denying a clearly existing Sixth Amendment right, the trio is
unsound.
G. Objections
This section anticipates and replies to four possible objections to
this Part’s claim that the trio leads to absurd or false conclusions and
is therefore unsound. First, as applied to some contexts, the trio does
not lead to absurd or false conclusions. Second, that the trio leads to
absurd conclusions does not make the trio unsound. Third, while
delay is a necessary consequence of post-conviction review, the seven
constitutional rights the trio would absurdly deny involve only
possible consequences. And fourth, the trio is inapplicable outside the
context of delayed executions.
1.

The Trio Sometimes Does Not Lead to Absurd or False
Conclusions

One might object that the trio sometimes does correctly deny
recognition of non-existent constitutional rights. For example,
suppose a defendant exercises her Sixth Amendment right of selfrepresentation229 with the consequence that her self-representation is
ineffective. She appeals her conviction claiming that her Sixth
Amendment right to effective representation was violated.230 The trio
would establish that a self-representing defendant has no Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. But this time the
trio gets it right. Self-representing defendants do not have a Sixth
Amendment right to effective representation.231 As a result, the trio
does not always lead to absurd or false conclusions.

228 See Vermont, 556 U.S. at 85 (“The State may be charged with [delays that]
resulted from the trial court’s failure to appoint . . . counsel with dispatch. Similarly,
the State may bear responsibility if there is ‘a breakdown in the public defender
system.’” (quoting Brillon v. Vermont, 955 A.2d 1108, 1111 (Vt. 2008))).
229 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 832 (1975) (“The Framers selected in
the Sixth Amendment a form of words that necessarily implies the right of selfrepresentation.”).
230 See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
231 See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46 (noting that “a defendant who elects to
represent himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense
amounted to a denial of ‘effective assistance of counsel’”).
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Though the objection is correct, it does not undermine this Part’s
claim that the trio absurdly denies clearly existing constitutional
rights. It merely shows that the trio does not do so in every possible
context. That the trio does not absurdly deny clearly existing
constitutional rights in every context does not negate that the trio does
so in some contexts. By doing so in some contexts simply means that
the trio does absurdly deny clearly existing constitutional rights and is
unsound.
2.

The Trio Entails Absurd Consequences, but Is Not Unsound

One might object that the trio absurdly denying clearly existing
rights expressly guaranteed by the Supreme Court fails to establish the
trio as unsound. The trio is right and the Supreme Court is simply
wrong. The trio correctly denies those seven constitutional rights that
the Supreme Court has incorrectly guaranteed. The conflict between
the trio and the Supreme Court does not necessarily establish the trio
as unsound, but merely forces a choice: accept the absurd
consequences or reject the trio. Proponents of the trio are free to
choose to accept the absurd consequences.
Even if true, the objection is not plausible. Consider the extent of
the absurd consequences that proponents of the trio would be forced
to accept. They would be forced to maintain that not just one or even
several constitutional rights do not exist, but that seven long-standing,
fundamental constitutional rights guaranteed by the Supreme Court
do not exist. Moreover, they would be forced to maintain that not only
was the Supreme Court wrong, but also the literal text of the
Constitution was wrong in granting some of these rights. As a
practical matter, how does a lower court denying a Lackey claim in
reliance on the trio repudiate seven Supreme Court rulings? Even the
Supreme Court, if and when it addresses a Lackey claim, would have
difficulty under principles of stare decisis in overruling seven, longstanding Court precedents (ranging across multiple constitutional
amendments) in order to assert the trio.
3.

Delay as a Necessary Consequence

One might object that delay between sentencing and execution is a
necessary, not merely possible, consequence of the post-conviction
review process necessary for satisfying the Eighth Amendment. In
contrast, many of the contexts in which the trio absurdly denies
clearly existing constitutional rights do not involve necessary
consequences. For example, ineffectiveness of counsel is a possible,
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but not necessary, consequence of exercising the right to counsel.
Non-representative jury pools, biased juries, and discrimination in
jury selection are possible, but not necessary, consequences of
exercising the right to a jury trial. While the objection is true, it fails
to gain any traction.
Courts denying Lackey claims generally carefully avoid terming the
delay a necessary consequence of post-conviction review.232 Rather,
they argue that post-conviction review is necessary for both accuracy
and fairness as well as for satisfying the Eighth Amendment.233 While
some delay may be a necessary consequence of post-conviction review,
the entirety of the delay might well be unnecessary and avoidable.234 A
court denying a Lackey claim on the ground that some delay was a
necessary and unavoidable consequence of post-conviction review
would leave itself no basis to deny a claim where the entirety of the
delay was unnecessary and avoidable. For example, how could the
entirety of twenty-five year average delays in California and Florida be
necessary and unavoidable given the national average of nearly sixteen
years?235 Consider a more specific example. Death row prisoner Joe
Smith’s thirty-year delay stemmed in part from two different

232 See supra Part I.C.2–3. Even the atypical references to delay as a necessary
consequence are not clearly claiming that the entirety of the delay was necessary and
unavoidable. See Bell v. State, 938 S.W.2d 35, 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc)
(“The existence of delays in appellant’s case have arguably been necessary to ensure
that his conviction and sentence are proper and not inhumane.” (emphasis added)).
Note that the court caveats its claim by use of the term “arguably.” Justice Thomas
also refers to delay as a necessary consequence. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 992
(1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (“Consistency would seem to
demand that those who accept our death penalty jurisprudence as a given also accept
the lengthy delay between sentencing and execution as a necessary consequence.”).
Two considerations should be noted. First, Justice Thomas fails to clearly state that
the entirety of a delay in a Lackey claim is a necessary consequence. Second, Justice
Thomas’ statement is conditioned on, and only applies to, those who “accept our
death penalty jurisprudence as a given.” It does not apply to a Lackey claimant who
need not accept that. Rather, his statement is directed to Justices generally opposed to
the death penalty that have insisted on the extensive post-conviction review process in
order for capital punishment to be constitutional.
233 See supra Part I.C.2–3.
234 See, e.g., Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1066-67 (C.D. Cal. 2014)
(maintaining that excessive delays are “reasonably necessary [neither] to the fair
administration of justice” nor “to protect an inmate’s rights”); People v. Simms, 736
N.E.2d 1092, 1143 (Ill. 2000) (Harrison, C.J., dissenting) (“I am unpersuaded by the
suggestion that United States courts must tolerate greater delays than the courts of
Europe because the American judicial system is more concerned with addressing
meritorious claims and achieving correct results.”).
235 See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text.
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“constitutionally defective sentencing proceedings.”236 Just as
ineffectiveness of counsel and biased juries are neither necessary nor
unavoidable, so also multiple constitutionally defective sentencing
hearings are neither necessary nor unavoidable. A court denying
Smith’s Lackey claim thus could not argue that the entirety of the
thirty-year delay was a necessary and unavoidable consequence of
post-conviction review. Similarly, for capital offenders, the average
delays in California of three to five years for the appointment of
counsel for direct appeal and eight to ten years for the appointment of
state habeas counsel are hardly necessary and unavoidable.237 As a
result, while some delay may be a necessary consequence, particularly
lengthy delay — excessive delay — is only a possible consequence.
Therefore, just as ineffectiveness of counsel and biased juries are
possible (not necessary) consequences, so also excessive delay is
merely a possible (not a necessary) consequence. For these very
reasons courts generally do not claim that the delay objected to by the
prisoner was a necessary consequence of post-conviction review.
4.

The Trio Is Inapplicable Outside the Context of Delayed
Executions

Perhaps the most likely objection is that the trio is inapplicable and
unfairly applied outside the context of delayed executions. The
objection is unpersuasive for several reasons. First, the three
arguments are not deeply embedded in an Eighth Amendment-specific
framework. Not only is there little about them relevant only to the
Eighth Amendment, but also there is little about them relevant to the
Eighth Amendment at all. Consider how little these arguments have to
say about the central concerns of the Eighth Amendment cruel and
unusual punishment clause — punishment, proportionality, the
penological purposes of retribution and deterrence, and evolving
standards of decency. Numerous commentators and judges have
criticized the courts denying Lackey claims for failing to engage in any
substantive Eighth Amendment analysis.238 To the three arguments a
236 Smith v. Arizona, 552 U.S. 985, 985-86 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari). See also, e.g., Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 993 (2002) (Breyer,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting that much of the twenty-seven year
delay stemmed from “the State’s repeated procedural errors”); Elledge v. Florida, 525
U.S. 944, 945 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (calculating that
“18 of the 23 years of delay” resulted from “the State’s own faulty procedures”).
237 See Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1066.
238 See, e.g., Smith v. Mahoney, 611 F.3d 978, 1005 (9th Cir. 2010) (Fletcher, J.,
dissenting) (“We have always found a way to avoid addressing Lackey claims on the
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fair response is to ask even if they are true, so what? What do they
have to do with the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment? Where is the analysis demonstrating that
execution following as much as thirty years or more of death row
incarceration is not cruel and unusual punishment?239 The trio fails to
even address whether decades of death row incarceration is or is not
punishment. The trio may hardly be defended as Eighth Amendmentspecific (and thus not subject to application to other constitutional
contexts) while simultaneously hiding from any substantive Eighth
Amendment analysis.
Second, it is perhaps because the courts denying Lackey claims
strategically wish to avoid substantive Eighth Amendment analysis
that these arguments are stated as broad propositions about
constitutional law and constitutional rights. They are meant to appeal
to our intuitions, common sense, and sense of reason. For example,
the following broadly framed statements used by courts to deny

merits . . . . We are out of excuses.”); McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1489 (9th Cir.
1995) (Norris, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority ignores the relevant ‘penological
justification’ analysis . . . . In fact, the majority evaluates the merits of McKenzie’s
Eighth Amendment claim without engaging in any legal analysis whatsoever.”); Jones,
31 F. Supp. 3d at 1065 (“When courts have rejected [Lackey claims] . . . they have
often not addressed whether any penological purpose of the death penalty continues
to be served more than two decades after the death sentence was imposed.”); Aarons,
supra note 146, at 42 (“[C]ourts have generally refused to consider the merits of the
[Lackey claim] argument . . . .”); Rapaport, supra note 75, at 1126 (noting that courts
typically fail “[t]o meet Lackey proponents on the ground on which they are
arguing”); Recent Cases, 114 HARV. L. REV. 648, 650 (2000) (“[T]he . . . majority failed
to address adequately [the prisoner’s] constitutional claims. The majority never
refuted the argument that excessive delays constitute cruel and unusual
punishment . . . .”); Root, supra note 146, at 310 (“Justice Thomas’ treatment of the
[Lackey] claim has pragmatic appeal, but he did not undertake a genuine assessment
of the question of delay . . . .”); Kara Sharkey, Comment, Delay in Considering the
Constitutionality of Inordinate Delay: The Death Row Phenomenon and the Eighth
Amendment, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 861, 886 (2013) (“[P]rocedural issues dispose of a
number of Lackey claims without consideration of the claim’s substantive
arguments.”); Angela April Sun, Note, “Killing Time” in the Valley of the Shadow of
Death: Why Systematic Preexecution Delays on Death Row Are Cruel and Unusual, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 1585, 1596-97 (2013) (“Courts often avoid the [Lackey] claim by
imposing procedural obstacles, or reject it based on precedent that itself provides little
explanation . . . [or exploit] its procedural complexity to avoid reaching the
substantive issues.”).
239 Cf. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1489 (Norris, J., dissenting) (“Instead [of substantive
analysis], the majority substitutes a policy lecture . . . [on disruptions to] ‘the orderly
administration of the death penalty’ . . . . But what does this have to do with whether
the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment will be violated if
McKenzie is executed after . . . [decades] on death row?”).
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Lackey claims hardly seem to be limited to Lackey claims and the
Eighth Amendment: “The value of speed should not trump the value
of accuracy.”240 “[The petitioner] ‘has benefitted from this careful and
meticulous process and cannot now complain that the expensive and
laborious process of habeas corpus appeals which exists to protect him
has violated other of his rights.’”241 “‘[I]t would indeed be a mockery
of justice if the delay incurred during the prosecution of claims that
fail on the merits could itself accrue into a substantive claim to the
very relief that had been sought and properly denied in the first
place.’”242 “A defendant must not be penalized for pursuing his
constitutional rights, but he should also not be able to benefit from the
ultimately unsuccessful pursuit of those rights.”243 All of the above
statements are broadly framed and not specific to Lackey claims or
even the Eighth Amendment. By being so broadly framed, and
arguably purposefully broadly framed, it is fair game to apply the three
arguments as broadly as they are framed.
Third, some aspects of the three arguments are themselves based on
other constitutional contexts. Consider the following argument:
“‘Having sought the aid of the judicial process and realizing the
deliberateness that a court employs in reaching a decision, the
defendants are not now able to criticize the very process which they so
frequently called upon.’”244 This could easily be an argument asserted
by Justice Thomas in one of his concurrences to the denial of
certiorari of Lackey claim petitions.245 Or it could easily be an
argument asserted by a court denying a Lackey claim.246 But it is
240

State v. Sparks, 68 So. 3d 435, 493 (La. 2011).
Thompson v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 517 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008)
(quoting White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 1996)).
242 Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 946, 959 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting McKenzie, 57
F.3d at 1466).
243 Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d 1473, 1491-92 (9th Cir. 1991).
244 United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 316-17 (1986) (quoting United
States v. Auerbach, 420 F.2d 921, 924 (5th Cir. 1969)).
245 Compare statement in text accompanying note 244, with Knight v. Florida, 528
U.S. 990, 990 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (“I am unaware
of any support in the American constitutional tradition or in this Court’s precedent for
the proposition that a defendant can avail himself of the panoply of appellate and
collateral procedures and then complain when his execution is delayed.”).
246 Compare statement in text accompanying note 244, with Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d
924, 933 (1995) (Luttig, J., concurring) (“It is a mockery of our system of justice . . .
for a convicted murderer, who, through his own interminable efforts of delay and
systemic abuse has secured the almost-indefinite postponement of his sentence, to
then claim that the almost-indefinite postponement renders his sentence
unconstitutional.”), and Gardner v. State, 234 P.3d 1115, 1143 (Utah 2010)
241
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neither. It is an argument used to reject a Sixth Amendment speedy
trial right violation claim.247 Consider as well the following argument:
“Virtually all of the delays of which the petitioner complains occurred
in the course of appellate proceedings and resulted either from the
actions of the petitioner or from the need to assure careful review of
an unusually complex case.”248 This argument as well could easily be
from Justice Thomas or a court denying a Lackey claim. Instead, it is
from the Supreme Court decision of Harrison v. United States denying
a Sixth Amendment speedy trial right violation claim.249 Note that the
Harrison argument is essentially the first two arguments of the trio.
That is, the delays cannot be unconstitutional because they result from
(i) the actions of the petitioner, not the State, and (ii) the necessity of
ensuring that the outcome is accurate and fair. Moreover, several
courts have explicitly relied on the Harrison argument in denying
Lackey claims.250 If aspects of the three arguments themselves look to
the analysis of constitutional rights outside the Eighth Amendment,
one can hardly maintain that the trio is limited to the narrow context
of the Eighth Amendment and Lackey claims. At the very least, the
three arguments may fairly be applied to the very context from which
they borrow — the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right. Ironically, as
Part II.F demonstrated, the three arguments deny the very right from
which they borrow — the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right. There
could be no better demonstration that the three arguments are

(“[B]ecause executions are delayed as a result of a petitioner’s decision to invoke legal
process, it is incongruous to hold that the time consumed by that process makes the
petitioner’s sentence unconstitutional.”).
247 Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. at 317 (“We cannot hold, on the facts before us, that the
delays asserted by respondents weigh sufficiently in support of their speedy trial claim
to violate the Speedy Trial Clause.”).
248 Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 221 n.4 (1968).
249 See id. (“The petitioner’s further contention that he was denied the right to a
speedy trial is wholly without merit and was properly rejected by the Court of
Appeals.”).
250 See Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d 1473, 1491 (9th Cir. 1991) (denying Lackey
claim based on, and by citing to, Harrison, 392 U.S. at 221 n.4); Richmond v. Ricketts,
640 F. Supp. 767, 803 (D. Ariz. 1986) (same); People v. Frye, 959 P.2d 183, 263 (Cal.
1998) (same). As a result, not only do courts denying Lackey claims rely on cases
addressing Sixth Amendment speedy trial right violation claims, but the very
arguments courts use to deny Lackey claims are nearly identical with and may be
derived from arguments used to reject speedy trial right violation claims. Therefore,
arguments nearly identical to and derived from the analysis of other constitutional
rights may fairly be applied to other constitutional rights, especially those rights from
which they borrow.
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unsound than their denial of the very constitutional right from which
they draw support.
III. WHY THE TRIO IS UNSOUND
Part II demonstrated that the three arguments, individually and
collectively, are unsound. Applying the arguments to a wide variety of
constitutional claims revealed them to lead to absurd or false
conclusions. They denied numerous clearly existing constitutional
rights. By leading to absurd or false conclusions, the arguments
themselves are unsound. While that more than suffices as a basis to
reject them, it still might be helpful to understand why they are
unsound. This might especially be helpful given these arguments have
enjoyed enormous influence in persuading courts to reject Lackey
claims. For nearly twenty years nearly every court addressing a Lackey
claim invoked them, and not a single court disagreed with them.251
How could arguments that have been so persuasive be unsound?
Part III explains both why the arguments seem so intuitively
appealing and why they are unsound. It identifies the flaw in each of
the three arguments. The flaw in the first argument — a defendant/
prisoner is responsible for the consequences of the constitutional
rights she chooses to exercise — is the false assumption that the
defendant/prisoner is ultimately responsible for the type of trial the
State conducts and the type of punishment the State imposes. The flaw
in the second and third arguments — the consequences of what is
necessary for accuracy, fairness, and satisfying the Constitution cannot
violate it — is the false assumption that what is necessary to satisfy the
Constitution is also sufficient. The identification of these false
assumptions provides an additional basis, independent from Part II,
for rejecting the trio.
A. Prisoner Choice and Fault
The underlying structure of the first argument is that if a defendant/
prisoner chooses X, then the defendant/prisoner, not the State, is
responsible for the consequences of X. With the defendant/prisoner
responsible for those consequences, those consequences do not
constitute a State violation of the defendant/prisoner’s constitutional
rights. As applied to the Lackey claim context, prisoners choose
appellate and collateral review with the consequences of delayed
execution and prolonged death row incarceration. Prisoners are
251

See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text.
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responsible for the consequences of their choices. Therefore, lengthy
delay and prolonged pre-execution incarceration cannot constitute a
State violation of prisoners’ constitutional rights. Both in the abstract
and as applied to the delayed execution context, the argument is
facially plausible if not persuasive. The argument appeals to our
intuitions. The argument is essentially stating that persons should be
responsible for the consequences of their choices. Who could disagree
with that? The argument also draws on some parallels with such
homespun wisdom as “you made your bed, now lie in it,” “as you reap
you shall sow,” “take the good with the bad,” “in for a penny in for a
pound,” and “with choices comes responsibility.”
But constitutional law simply does not follow such conventional
wisdom. As seen in Part II, that defendants choose to exercise
constitutional rights does not preclude consequences of those choices
from being unconstitutional. Defendants choosing the assistance of
appointed counsel may have the consequences of ineffective assistance
of counsel252 and delayed trials.253 Despite these being consequences of
defendants’ choices, they are no less unconstitutional. Defendants
choosing jury trials may have the consequences of jury pools
unrepresentative of the community,254 biased juries,255 or prospective
jurors excluded for race-based reasons.256 Despite these being
consequences of defendants’ choices, they are no less unconstitutional.
Defendants choosing not to testify may have the consequences of
courts refusing to instruct juries not to draw negative inferences
regarding defendants’ silence257 and prosecutors inviting juries to draw
such negative inferences.258 Despite these being consequences of
defendants’ choices, they are no less unconstitutional. Despite the
intuitive appeal of holding defendants responsible for the
consequences of their choices, the above examples demonstrate that
constitutional law often holds the State responsible for the
consequences of defendants’ choices.
Moreover, constitutional law may hold the State responsible for the
consequences of defendants’ choices even in the arguable absence of
any State action. For example in Cuyler v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court
addressed whether the ineffectiveness of privately retained (not State252
253
254
255
256
257
258

See supra text accompanying notes 20–23.
See supra Part II.F.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.C.
See supra Part II.D.
See supra Part II.E.
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appointed) counsel constituted a Sixth Amendment violation of the
defendant’s right to the assistance of counsel.259 Not only did the
defendant choose to exercise his right to the assistance of counsel, but
also the defendant chose his counsel. If the consequence of those
choices by the defendant was the ineffectiveness of counsel, how could
the State be responsible when seemingly it was not the State’s fault?
The State seemingly did nothing to contribute to the ineffectiveness of
counsel. The state of Pennsylvania made this very argument:
ineffectiveness of “retained counsel does not involve state action” and
thus cannot be the basis for a constitutional violation.260 In ruling that
defendants have the constitutional right to effective assistance of even
privately retained counsel,261 the Court explained that “[t]his Court’s
decisions establish that a state criminal trial, a proceeding initiated
and conducted by the State itself, is an action of the State within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.”262 Cuyler further explained
that “[w]hen a State obtains a criminal conviction through such a trial
[a trial in which the defendant lacks effective assistance of counsel], it
is the State that unconstitutionally deprives the defendant of his
liberty.”263 Thus, it is the State that is prosecuting the defendant, and it
is the State that has the ultimate constitutional duty and responsibility
to provide the defendant with a fair trial, which includes the effective
assistance of counsel.264 As a result, the State, not defendants, may be
responsible for the consequences of defendants’ choices even in the
arguable absence of any State action. The State has the ultimate
constitutional duty to conduct a fair trial.
Just as with trials, the State is also ultimately constitutionally
responsible for the nature of the punishment it imposes and the
manner of its imposition.265 For example, suppose one chooses to
259 Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 343 (1980) (“[W]e must decide whether the
failure of retained counsel to provide adequate representation can render a trial so
fundamentally unfair as to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.”)
260 Id. at 342.
261 See id. at 344 (“A proper respect for the Sixth Amendment disarms [the State’s]
contention that defendants who retain their own lawyers are entitled to less protection
than defendants for whom the State appoints counsel.”).
262 Id. at 343 (citing Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236-37 (1941); Moore v.
Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 90-91 (1923)).
263 Id. at 343.
264 See id. at 344 (“[T]he State’s conduct of a criminal trial itself implicates the
State in the defendant’s conviction . . .”).
265 See, e.g., Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014) (“[T]he Eighth
Amendment reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the dignity of all
persons.”); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (“[I]f a State wishes to
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commit a crime. A possible consequence of that choice is punishment
for the commission of the crime. That punishment is a consequence of
the defendant’s choice does not preclude that the nature of the
punishment or manner of its imposition might violate the Eighth
Amendment. Why? The State is ultimately responsible for the type of
punishment and manner of its imposition. Despite the crime being the
defendant’s choice, the punishment being a consequence of that
choice, and the State not at fault for or the cause of the defendant’s
choice to commit the crime, the State has the ultimate constitutional
responsibility and duty to not impose cruel and unusual punishment.
Consider another example. Suppose a death row prisoner
intentionally consumes illegal drugs, ingests toxic substances, or
sustains a head injury in an attempt to become insane with the
purpose of delaying or permanently preventing execution. The
prisoner succeeds and is pronounced insane. Not only did the prisoner
choose to commit a capital crime, with the consequence of the risk of
capital punishment, but also the prisoner chose to harm himself with
the consequence of the risk of insanity. The prisoner is the sole cause
of and at fault for everything — the commission of the crime, the
punishment, and the insanity. Surely the State can constitutionally
execute the prisoner? It cannot. As the Supreme Court in Ford v.
Wainwright held, “the Eighth Amendment prohibits a state from
carrying out a sentence of death upon a prisoner who is insane.”266
Executing an insane person constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment.267 Affirmed by the Court in Panetti v. Quarterman,268 Ford
announced a categorical bar against executing the insane.269 That a
authorize capital punishment it has a constitutional responsibility to tailor and apply
its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death
penalty.”); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(“The State, even as it punishes, must treat its members with respect for their intrinsic
worth as human beings.”); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (“The basic
concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.
While the State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this
power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.”); Youngjae Lee, The
Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 683 (2005)
(“The purpose of the Eighth Amendment ban on ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’
however, is to place constraints on the ways in which we pursue [the penological
purposes of punishment].”).
266 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986).
267 See id.
268 551 U.S. 930, 934 (2007) (noting the Eighth Amendment prohibition against
executing the insane (citing Ford, 477 U.S. at 409-10)).
269 See, e.g., Jonathan Greenberg, Note, For Every Action There Is a Reaction: The
Procedural Pushback Against Panetti v. Quarterman, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 227, 229
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person is insane is sufficient to trigger the bar, how or why the person
is insane is irrelevant.270 Therefore, despite all of the prisoner’s choices
and fault for the consequences of those choices, the State has the
ultimate responsibility not to impose cruel and unusual punishment.
That the insanity was a consequence (even intended) of the prisoner’s
choices does not preclude imposition of capital punishment on this
prisoner from being unconstitutionally cruel and unusual.271
Similarly, that a death row prisoner chooses appellate and collateral
review, with the (perhaps even intended) consequences of excessively
delaying execution and prolonging pre-execution incarceration does
not necessarily preclude execution following as much as thirty years
or more of death row incarceration from being unconstitutionally
cruel and unusual punishment. No matter what a prisoner chooses,
causes or intends, the State has the ultimate constitutional
responsibility of not imposing cruel and unusual punishment. As a
result, the flaw of the prisoner choice argument is the false assumption
that death row prisoners are necessarily responsible for the
consequences of their choices, the type of punishment the State
imposes, and the manner of its imposition.
Interestingly, in addition to the State, the Supreme Court may bear
responsibility. Three justices supportive of the death penalty have
assigned blame to the Court itself for delays between sentencing and
execution. Objecting to a delay of eight years, former Chief Justice
William Rehnquist stated, “I do not think that this Court can continue
to evade some responsibility for this mockery of our criminal justice
system.”272 Referring to the average delays of nearly twenty-five years
in Florida, Justice Antonin Scalia admitted that “most of the delay has

(2012) (“Ford . . . establish[ed] a categorical exclusion shielding [insane] defendants
from capital punishment . . .”).
270 The State, however, may be permitted to take measures to restore the prisoner
to sanity. See, e.g., Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003) (“A State
does not violate the Eighth Amendment as interpreted by Ford when it executes a
prisoner who became incompetent during his long stay on death row but who
subsequently regained competency through appropriate medical care.”).
271 For another example, suppose a juvenile whose age makes him ineligible for
capital punishment lies about his age claiming that he is above the age of capital
punishment eligibility. Despite the juvenile choosing to make himself eligible for the
death penalty and being responsible for the consequences of that choice, executing the
juvenile would nonetheless constitute a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (imposing a
categorical bar on execution of persons under the age of eighteen).
272 Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 958 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
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been because of rules that we have imposed.”273 Even Justice Thomas
conceded that “in most cases raising this novel [Lackey] claim, the
delay in carrying out the prisoner’s execution stems from this Court’s
Byzantine death penalty jurisprudence.”274 Whether excessive delay is
claimed to be the fault of the State, the Court, or the prisoner,
execution following excessively prolonged death row incarceration is
no more or less a constitutional violation; it is no more or less a cruel
and unusual punishment.
B. Post-Conviction Review Necessary for Accuracy and Fairness
The underlying structure of the second argument is that if X is
necessary to ensure accuracy and fairness, then any consequence of X
must be constitutionally permissible. In the delayed execution context,
appellate and collateral review is necessary to ensure accurate and fair
death sentences. Consequences of that review are delay between
sentencing and execution and prolongation of the pre-execution death
row incarceration. Therefore, delay and prolongation of the death row
incarceration must be constitutionally permissible. In short, in a
hierarchy of constitutional values, speed should not trump accuracy.
Both in the abstract and as applied to the delayed execution context,
the argument seems facially plausible and perhaps even persuasive.
But applying the argument to other contexts helps reveal its flaws.
As seen in Part II, that the exercise of some right is necessary to ensure
accuracy and fairness does not preclude a consequence of the exercise
of that right from violating another constitutional right. The right to
counsel is necessary to ensure an accurate and fair verdict.275
Exercising the right may have the consequences of ineffective
assistance of counsel276 and delayed trials.277 That these consequences
stem from what is necessary to ensure an accurate and fair verdict
makes them no less unconstitutional. The right to a jury trial is
necessary to ensure an accurate and fair verdict.278 Exercising the right
may have the consequences of jury pools unrepresentative of the

273 Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014) (No. 1210882), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/
12-10882_6kh7.pdf.
274 Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 991 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari).
275 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
276 See supra text accompanying notes 20–23.
277 See supra Part II.F.
278 See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
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community,279 biased juries,280 and prospective jurors excluded for
race-based reasons.281 That these consequences stem from what is
necessary to ensure an accurate and fair verdict makes them no less
unconstitutional. The right not to testify is necessary to ensure an
accurate and fair verdict.282 Exercising the right may have the
consequences of courts refusing to instruct juries not to draw negative
inferences regarding defendants’ silence283 and prosecutors inviting
juries to draw such inferences.284 That these consequences stem from
what is necessary to ensure an accurate and fair verdict makes them no
less unconstitutional.
The flaw in this second argument rests on the necessary/sufficient
distinction.285 The second argument conflates what is necessary for
accuracy and fairness with what is sufficient to satisfy the
Constitution. The second argument assumes that what is necessary to
ensure accuracy and fairness is sufficient to satisfy the Constitution.286
279

See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.B.
281 See supra Part II.C.
282 See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
283 See supra Part II.D.
284 See supra Part II.E.
285 See, e.g., BAGGINI & FOSL, supra note 19, at 158 (“Sufficient conditions are what
is enough for something to be the case. Necessary conditions are what is required for
something to be the case.”); Boruch A. Brody, Glossary of Logical Terms, in 5 THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 57, 60 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967) (“A necessary condition is
a circumstance in whose absence a given event could not occur or a given thing could
not exist. A sufficient condition is a circumstance such that whenever it exists a given
event occurs or a given thing exists.”). “Confusion may result if the
[necessary/sufficient] distinction is not heeded.” SIMON BLACKBURN, THE OXFORD
DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 73 (1st ed. 1996). A condition may be necessary without
being sufficient. For example, being able to lift at least 50 pounds is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for being able to lift 100 pounds. Conversely, a condition may be
sufficient without being necessary. For example, being able to simultaneously lift two
items that weigh 50 pounds each is a sufficient condition for being able to lift 100
pounds but is not a necessary condition when there are other ways of being able to lift
100 pounds — for example, by being able to simultaneously lift one item weighing 75
pounds and another item weighing 25 pounds. A single condition may be both
necessary and sufficient. For example, “[b]eing composed of H2O is a necessary and
sufficient condition for something being water.” BAGGINI & FOSL, supra note 19, at 159.
And some conditions may be individually necessary and jointly sufficient. For example,
“to be ice, a substance must both be H2O and at [a freezing temperature].” Id.
286 Cf. Recent Cases, supra note 238, at 650-51 (“The court [denying the Lackey
claim] failed to acknowledge the possibility that extensive post-trial procedures could
be both necessary and cruel — necessary because they satisfy a constitutional
mandate, and cruel because they generate delays prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment.” (emphasis added)).
280
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If that assumption were true, the second argument would be sound.287
But that assumption is false. As demonstrated in Part II, the exercise of
many different constitutional rights may be necessary to ensure
accuracy and fairness but are not individually sufficient to satisfy the
Constitution. As a result, the consequences of that which is necessary
to ensure accuracy and fairness sometimes do violate the Constitution.
Because the assumption of the second argument that what is necessary
must also be sufficient is false, the second argument is unsound.288
C. Post-Conviction Review Necessary Under Eighth Amendment
The underlying structure of the third argument is if X is necessary to
satisfy the Constitution, then any consequence of X cannot violate the
Constitution. In the delayed execution context, appellate and
collateral review is necessary to satisfy the Eighth Amendment.
Consequences of that review are delay between sentencing and
287 If what is necessary to ensure accuracy and fairness is also sufficient to satisfy
the Constitution, then any consequence of what is necessary to ensure accuracy and
fairness cannot violate the Constitution.
288 The flaw in the alternatively formulated second argument — that speed should
not trump accuracy — rests on the implicit assumption that those represent the only
two options. Applied to a Sixth Amendment context, see supra Part II.F, the argument
suggests defendants have the choice of either an excessively delayed trial with counsel
or a speedy trial without counsel. But because defendants are constitutionally entitled
to both speed and accuracy, the assumption is false. If the State cannot provide the
third option of both speed and accuracy, there is an available remedy: no trial and the
indictment or charges dismissed with prejudice. There is no constitutional obligation
that the defendant be prosecuted. Each of the first two options is unconstitutional;
only the third option (or its remedy) is constitutional.
Similarly, in the Lackey claim context, the argument that speed should not trump
accuracy suggests that there are only two options. First, an expeditious execution but
without the review that ensures execution is warranted; second, an excessively and
unreasonably delayed execution with full review. Because that assumption that there are
only two options is false in the Sixth Amendment context above, that assumption may
also be false in the Lackey claim context. Just as exercise of the right to counsel does not
preclude a speedy trial right violation, so also exercise of the right to full review of a
capital sentence does not necessarily preclude execution following as much as thirty
years or more of death row incarceration from being cruel and unusual punishment.
Rather than speed trumping accuracy or accuracy trumping speed, both speed and
accuracy may constitutionally be required. Because both are required in the above Sixth
Amendment context, both may be required in the Lackey claim context. If the State
cannot provide the third option of both full review and freedom from cruel and unusual
punishment there is an available remedy: reduce the capital punishment to life
imprisonment without parole. There is no constitutional obligation that death row
prisoners be executed. Each of the first two options may be unconstitutional; only the
third option (or its remedy) cannot be unconstitutional. Neither speed nor accuracy
necessarily supplants the other; rather, the right to each may supplement the other.
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execution and prolongation of the pre-execution death row
incarceration. As consequences of what is necessary to satisfy the
Eighth Amendment, delay and prolongation of the death row
incarceration cannot violate it. Both in the abstract and as applied to
the delayed execution context, the argument seems facially plausible
and perhaps even persuasive.
But applying the argument to other contexts helps reveal its flaws.
As seen in Part II, that some right is necessary to satisfy one aspect or
part of the Constitution does not preclude a consequence of the
exercise of that right from violating another constitutional right. The
right to counsel is necessary to satisfy the Sixth Amendment.289
Exercising the right may have the consequences of ineffective
assistance of counsel290 and delayed trials.291 That these consequences
stem from what is necessary to satisfy the Constitution makes them no
less unconstitutional. The right to a jury trial is necessary to satisfy the
Sixth Amendment.292 Exercising the right may have the consequences
of jury pools unrepresentative of the community,293 biased juries,294
and prospective jurors excluded for race-based reasons.295 That these
consequences stem from what is necessary to satisfy the Sixth
Amendment makes them no less unconstitutional. The right not to
testify is necessary to satisfy the Fifth Amendment.296 Exercising the
right may have the consequences of courts refusing to instruct juries
not to draw negative inferences regarding defendants’ silence297 and
prosecutors inviting juries to draw such inferences.298 That these
consequences stem from what is necessary to satisfy the Fifth
Amendment makes them no less unconstitutional.
Just as in the second argument, the flaw in this third argument rests
on the necessary/sufficient distinction.299 The third argument conflates
what is constitutionally necessary with what is constitutionally
sufficient. The third argument assumes that what is necessary to
289

See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 20–23.
291 See supra Part II.F.
292 See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
293 See supra Part II.A.
294 See supra Part II.B.
295 See supra Part II.C.
296 See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
297 See supra Part II.D.
298 See supra Part II.E.
299 For an example of the Supreme Court’s utilization of the necessary/sufficient
distinction, see Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 23 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See also supra note 285.
290
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satisfy the Constitution is sufficient to satisfy the Constitution. If that
assumption were correct, the third argument would be sound.300 But
that assumption is false. As demonstrated in Part II, the exercise of
many different constitutional rights may be necessary to satisfy the
protections the Constitution affords criminal defendants but are not
individually sufficient to satisfy the Constitution. As a result, the
consequences of what is necessary to satisfy the Constitution
sometimes do violate the Constitution. Because the assumption of the
third argument that what is necessary must also be sufficient is false,
the third argument is unsound.
CONCLUSION
Upholding the constitutionality of execution following as much as
thirty years or more of post-sentence, pre-execution death row
incarceration rests principally on a trio of arguments. This trio,
however, leads to absurd or false conclusions. In addition to denying
Eighth Amendment protection to Lackey claims, the trio absurdly
denies seven clearly existing constitutional rights emanating from the
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments and expressly guaranteed by
the Supreme Court. Ironically, the trio even denies the very right —
the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial — from which the trio
draws support. By denying long-standing constitutional rights, the trio
establishes too high a bar for a claimed constitutional right to meet. If
seven fundamental constitutional rights guaranteed by the Supreme
Court cannot meet this too-high standard, then a Lackey claim’s
failure to meet this too-high standard is no longer evidence that it fails
to warrant constitutional protection. Moreover, by leading to absurd
or false conclusions — denying clearly existing constitutional rights
— the trio is itself unsound. True, demonstrating that the primary
support for the constitutionality of excessively delayed executions is
unsound does not affirmatively establish the unconstitutionality of
such executions. But eliminating the support of the trio does eliminate
the principal obstacle to courts recognizing that execution following
as much as thirty years or more of death row incarceration violates the
Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. It clears the path for courts to recognize Lackey claims.

300 If what is necessary to satisfy the Constitution is sufficient to satisfy the
Constitution, then any consequence of what is necessary to satisfy the Constitution
cannot violate it.

